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First Impressions 
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of issues of first impression 
identified by a federal court of appeals opinion announced between 
February 25, 2008 and October 8, 2008. This collection is organized by 
circuit. 
Each summary presents an issue of first impression, a brief 
analysis, and the court’s conclusion. It is intended to give only the 
briefest synopsis of the first impression issue, not a comprehensive 
analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will 
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point. If a circuit 
does not appear on this list, it means that the editors did not identify any 
cases from that circuit for the specified time period that presented an 
issue of First Impression. 
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FIRST CIRCUIT 
U.S. v. Beatty, 538 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the 2003 amendments to the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines granted the government discretion in deciding whether to file 
a motion for an additional one-level decrease in the defendant’s base 
level for acceptance of responsibility. Id. 
ANALYSIS: The court followed every other circuit court that has 
decided this issue in its decision and held that the reduction is contingent 
upon a motion being filed by the government which requests the 
reduction. Id. at 14. The amended sentencing guideline, § 3E1.1(b), 
states that once a defendant has qualified for an offense level of 16 or 
greater, and upon motion of the government stating that the defendant 
has assisted authorities, the defendant qualifies for a decrease in the 
offense level by one level. Id. at 13–14. This language mirrors the 
language used in § 5K1.1, which was interpreted by the court in Wade v. 
United States as granting the government discretion to file the motion but 
limiting that discretion by stating that if the defendant can show that the 
government’s motive was “based on an unconstitutional motive” or was 
“not rationally related to any legitimate Government end” then the 
discretion would be overturned. Id. at 16. The amendments to the 
sentencing guidelines changed the focus of the defendant’s ability to be 
granted an offense level reduction. Id. Formerly the focus was based on 
whether the timeliness of the plea enabled the government to avoid trial 
preparation. Currently, the focus has shifted to whether the government 
believes that the acceptance of responsibility is genuine. Id. at 19. The 
court noted that granting the government broad discretion to file the 
motion may create a disincentive for defendants to challenge sentencing 
issues; however, the court felt that this was a cost that the defendant was 
going to have to weigh and that there was nothing improper about 
creating such a disincentive. Id. at 21. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the amendments granted the 
government discretionary power to file a motion for a one-level 
reduction in the defendant’s base level. Id. at 15. The court further stated 
that the discretionary decision should only be challenged if the refusal to 
file the motion was based on an “unconstitutional motive” or was “not 
rationally related to any governmental end.” Id. 
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United States v. Vazquez-Botet, Nos., 532 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the district court committed legal error in 
interpreting “benefit . . . to be received in return for the payment” in § 
2C1.1(b)(2)(A) to mean the payment a person in the defendant’s position 
at the time the extortion occurred could have reasonably expected. Id. at 
67. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the plain language of the 
sentencing guideline denoted the Sentencing Commission’s intention that 
the inquiry be forward-looking. Id. The court then observed that the 5th 
Circuit has similarly held that “in determining the amount of benefits to 
be received, courts may consider the expected benefits, not only the 
actual benefit received.” Id. The court stated that this prospective 
analysis was analogous to “case law on computing loss for purposes of 
sentencing.” Id. “We have held that when a person is convicted of a 
fraud offense, a proper analysis of the loss he intended to cause asks 
what a person in his position at the relevant time would reasonably have 
expected to happen to the victim as a result of the fraud.” Id. The court 
stated “the rationale for this ex ante inquiry lies in the purpose of the 
exercise: to set the defendant’s punishment at a level commensurate with 
the degree of his moral culpability.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that the best interpretation of 
“benefit . . . to be received in return for the payment” is the benefit a 
person in the defendant’s position at the time of the extortion would 
reasonably have expected the victim to receive by paying him the money 
he demanded. Id. 
 
Connectu LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether “an amended complaint that switches the 
basis of the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction from the existence 
of diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), to the existence of a 
federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, should be given effect when filed as 
of right before any jurisdictional challenge has been mounted.” Id. at 85. 
ANALYSIS: This case centers around a dispute between a group of 
Harvard undergraduate students who allegedly founded Connectu LLC, a 
social networking site designed toward college students. Id. at 86. 
Defendants allegedly stole the idea and created Facebook. Id. Connectu 
filed an amended complaint as of right under Fed. R. 15(a), the substance 
of which transformed the case from a diversity action to a federal 
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question action. Id. at 85. The court rejected the defendant’s contention 
that the action “live or die from a jurisdictional standpoint as of the time 
of filing regardless of subsequent changes in either the facts or the 
underlying jurisdictional allegations.” Id. at 90. The court found support 
in Rockwell International Corp. v. United States, wherein the Supreme 
Court stated that “when a plaintiff files a complaint in federal court and 
then voluntarily amends the complaint, courts look to the amended 
complaint to determine jurisdiction.” Id. at 91. The court also rejected the 
lower court’s interpretation of the “time of filing” rule and opined that 
“no court has ever read the time-of-filing rule to bar a plaintiff from 
switching jurisdictional horses before any jurisdictional issue has been 
raised, abandoning a claimed entitlement to diversity jurisdiction, and 
substituting a claimed entitlement to federal question jurisdiction.” Id. at 
92. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “the instant appeal is not moot; 
that the amended complaint, filed as of right, superseded and replaced 
the original complaint; that the action was at that point transformed into a 
federal question case (at least in the circumstances at hand); that the 
time-of-filing rule does not apply to such a case.” Id. at 96. The court 
further found that “the district court erred in looking to the original 
complaint and applying the time-of-filing rule. Id. The district court 
therefore mistakenly granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss; the court 
had, and should have exercised, federal question jurisdiction over the 
action.” Id. 
 
United States v. Hernandez, 541 F.3d 422 (1st Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether § 4A1.1(d) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 
which requires a sentencing court to add two points to a defendant’s 
criminal history score “if the defendant committed the instant offense 
while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation,” is 
applicable when a defendant’s direct involvement in the instant offense 
of conspiracy occurred before the other criminal justice sentence was 
imposed, even though the overall conspiracy spanned a period running 
both before and after the secondary offense was committed. Id. at 424. 
ANALYSIS: The court determined that although the use of “i.e.” was 
imprecise, the statute should be read as “[t]wo points are added if the 
defendant committed any part of the instant offense (and any relevant 
conduct) while under any criminal justice sentence.” Id. The court 
reached this conclusion because the definition of “offense” in the 
Guidelines encompasses: “the offense of conviction and all relevant 
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conduct.” Id. (emphasis in original). Looking to how other courts had 
applied § 4A1.1(d) in analogous circumstances, the court determined that 
the portion of the statute relied on by the defendant allowed the use of 
relevant conduct to broaden the boundaries of the offense of conviction 
rather than to shrink those boundaries. Id. at 425. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that the “guideline provision 
says what it means and means what it says.” Id. at 422. Therein, the court 
affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentenced him in accordance 
with the lower court’s decision. Id. 
 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the Attorney General validly implemented the 
reinstatement of removal statute under 8 C.F.R. § 241.8. Id. at 145. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that although the issue is one of first 
impression within the 2nd Circuit, “[e]very other circuit that has 
considered the issue has upheld the regulation as a valid interpretation of 
the [Immigration and Nationality Act].” Id. at 146. To assess the validity 
of the regulation at issue, the court applied the two prong test 
annunciated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 
Id. Under the first prong of Chevron, the court must determine “‘whether 
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue . . . . If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter’ . . . . However, if 
the statute is found to be ambiguous, the question for us under the second 
prong ‘is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.’” Id. 
Applying Chevron to the present matter, the court determined that 
Congress was ambiguous regarding the procedures applicable to aliens 
who reenter the United States in violation of an existing removal order 
under INA §§ 240 and 241(a)(5). Id. at 148. The court then turned to the 
second prong of the test and found that the Attorney General had already 
interpreted the statute within 8 C.F.R. § 241.8. Id. at 149. Therefore, the 
court declared a lack of “authority to re-construe the statute, even to 
avoid potential constitutional problems.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that the Attorney General’s 
interpretation § 241.8 reflected a plausible reading of the statutory text, 
and the reinstatement procedure did not violate the alien’s due process 
rights under the Fifth Amendment. Id. 
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United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2008) 
Editor’s Note: This case involves two issues of first impression 
concerning the standard of review in criminal matters. 
 
QUESTION ONE: What is “the standard for determining what 
[discoverable] classified information a criminal defendant is entitled to 
receive during discovery?” Id. at 76. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by noting that “the House 
of Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence stated categorically 
in its report on CIPA that ‘the common law state secrets privilege is not 
applicable in the criminal arena.’” Id. at 79. The court stated that the 
committee interpreted the Supreme Court cases dealing with the state 
secrets doctrine too broadly, and that those cases “recognize the 
privilege, but conclude that it must give way under some circumstances 
to a criminal defendant’s right to present a meaningful defense.” Id. The 
court purported to adopt the Roviaro standard enunciated by the Supreme 
Court in determining what discoverable, classified evidence is to be 
admitted in criminal proceedings. Id. However, the court changed the 
language of Roviaro from “relevant and helpful to the defense” to 
“material to the defense,” which is arguably a more narrow construction. 
Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that discoverable, classified 
evidence may be admitted into criminal proceedings if it is “helpful or 
material to the defense.” Id. at 80. 
 
QUESTION TWO: What is “the standard of review for denials of 
motions to intervene in criminal cases?” Id. at 76. 
ANALYSIS: Although “[t]he Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
make no reference to a motion to intervene in a criminal case,” the court 
acknowledged that such motions are vital to the “public’s First 
Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings.” Id. at 81. Since 
denials of motions to intervene in civil cases are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, the court concluded that the same standard should apply in 
criminal cases. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that denials of motions to 
intervene in criminal cases are to be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. 
 
2008] First Impressions 105 
 
Estate of Pew v. Cardarelli, 527 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a state-law deceptive practices claim 
predicated on the sale of a security” is removable to federal court 
pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). Id. at 29. 
ANALYSIS: The court first identified 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(C), 
which does not extend original jurisdiction to district courts, and 28 
U.S.C. § 1453(d)(3), which prevents defendants from removing actions 
to federal court and precludes appellate review of district courts’ remand 
orders for “any class action[s] that solely involve[] a claim that relates to 
the rights, duties (including fiduciary duties), and obligations relating to 
or created by or pursuant to any security,” as the only potentially relevant 
statutes. Id. at 29–30. It posited that “rights” refer, for example, to “rights 
in the holders to a rate of interest and to principal repayment at certain 
dates” and cannot include the right to bring any cause of action relating 
to a security because that would render superfluous the exceptions to 
federal jurisdiction in §§ 1332(d)(9) and 1453(d)(1) for class actions 
“concerning a covered security.” Id. at 31. The court explained that 
“duties” are owed by persons administering securities and therefore 
“obligations” must “be those created in instruments, such as a certificate 
of incorporation, an indenture, a note, or some other corporate 
document.” Id. at 31–33. The 2nd Circuit explained that claims 
“relat[ing] to” these “rights” and “obligations” are those “grounded in the 
terms of the security itself” such as “where the interest rate was pegged 
to a rate set by a bank that later merges into another bank, or where a 
bond series is discontinued, or where a failure to negotiate replacement 
credit results in a default on principal.” Id. at 31–32. The court then 
confirmed its statutory analysis by considering the relevant legislative 
history in Senate Judiciary Committee Report No. 109-14. Id. at 32–33. 
Citing the Report, the court reiterated that the CAFA exceptions apply 
only to litigation regarding “‘the terms of the securities issued by 
business enterprises’” and that section 1332(d)(9) is “‘intended to cover 
disputes over the meaning of the terms of a security . . . .’” Id. at 33. 
Finally, the court declared that it had appellate jurisdiction where the 
district court below had original jurisdiction. Id. at 31. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that the CAFA exceptions in 
§§ 1332(d)(9) and 1453(d)(3) “apply only to suits that seek to enforce the 
terms of instruments that create and define securities, and to duties 
imposed on persons who administer securities.” Id. at 33. It therefore 
concluded that state-law fraud claims based on the sale of securities do 
not fall within the exception and are removable to federal court. Id. 
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United States v. Douglas, 525 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether a court has an obligation, pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3005, to continue the appointment of a second attorney assigned 
to a defendant indicted for a capital crime when the government notifies 
the court that it will no longer seek the death penalty. Id. at 235. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit first noted that § 3005 is silent on the 
issue. Id. However, the court agreed with a majority of the other federal 
courts of appeals having considered the issue that a criminal “matter is 
no longer a capital case within the meaning of § 3005” once the 
government notifies the court and the defendant that it no longer intends 
to seek the death penalty. Id. at 237. Consequently, the court held that the 
statute no longer required the district court to maintain the dual 
appointment of attorneys under these circumstances. Id. However, the 
court expressed deep concern about the rights to a fair trial for those 
accused of criminal offenses. Id. at 238. Thus, the court maintained that 
district courts could continue the appointment of a second attorney in 
their discretion. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that § 3005 does not entitle a 
defendant to a second attorney “after the government’s renunciation of 
any intent to seek the death penalty” but does not preclude a district court 
from continuing the dual appointment in its discretion. Id. at 237–38. 
 
Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether an employee can bring an action under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) against his 
employer because of his association with a person of another race. Id. at 
131. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that under “Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as relevant, provides that it is an ‘unlawful 
employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual . . . 
because of such individual’s race.’” Id. at 137. The court further noted 
that “in 1991, Congress amended the statute to make clear that ‘an 
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that race . . . was a motivating factor for any employment 
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.’ 42 
U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(m).” Id. The court reasoned that “[a]n employment 
decision, then, violates Title VII when it is ‘based in whole or in part on 
discrimination.’” Id. at 137–38. Therefore, “[t]o avoid summary 
judgment in an employment discrimination case, ‘the plaintiff is not 
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required to show that the employer’s proffered reasons were false or 
played no role in the employment decision, but only that they were not 
the only reasons and that the prohibited factor was at least one of the 
‘motivating’ factors.” Id. The court agreed with the district court that 
“Holcomb has established a prima facie case of race-based employment 
discrimination under Title VII” and that the defendant sustained its 
burden of proof under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. Id. at 140–
41. The court, however, disagreed with the district court finding that 
even though Iona produced evidence that it acted for a non-
discriminatory reason, which would under normal circumstances render 
Holcomb incapable of relying on the presumption of discrimination 
raised by the prima facie case, Holcomb produced evidence “to prove 
that the decision was partly so motivated to prevail on the ultimate merits 
of his claim.” Id. at 141–42. 
CONCLUSION: The court held for the first time, “that an employer 
may violate Title VII if it takes action against an employee because of 
the employee’s association with a person of another race.” Id. at 131. 
The court reversed and remanded the case to the district court so that a 
reasonable jury could determine whether “Holcomb was fired in part 
because he was married to a black woman.” Id. 
 
Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 527 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a magistrate judge may order a case 
remanded to state court under [28 U.S.C.] § 1447(c),” and whether such 
orders are dispositive. Id. at 265. 
ANALYSIS: Because a § 1447(c) remand order determines the 
fundamental question of whether a case could proceed in a federal court, 
the court found that it is not distinguishable from a motion to dismiss an 
action from federal court based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
for the purpose of § 636(b)(1)(A). Id. at 266. Adopting the reasoning of 
the 3rd, 6th, and 10th Circuits, the 2nd Circuit held that a remand order 
was a dispositive order, since it is functionally equivalent to an order of 
dismissal. Id. As such, a remand order can only be entered by district 
courts. Id. 
CONCLUSION: A remand order is dispositive and can only be 
entered by district courts. Id. Therefore, a party is entitled to a district 
court’s de novo review of a magistrate judge’s report and 
recommendation regarding an opposing party’s motion to remand. Id. 
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United States v. Yannotti, 541 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether, for the purposes of sentencing a defendant 
for participation in a RICO conspiracy, the court should calculate the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range “based only on predicate conduct that 
a fact-finder found him to have engaged in beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
Id. at 128. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “to secure [defendant]’s 
conviction for RICO conspiracy, the government was not required to 
prove actual commission of a single predicate act.” Id. at 129. “Because 
overt acts are not distinct offenses that must be proven to sustain a RICO 
conspiracy conviction, and the RICO conspiracy charged in this case is 
appropriately viewed as single-object conspiracy, we now join the First 
and Sixth Circuits in concluding that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(d) is 
inapplicable.” Id. Finally, the court acknowledged that, at sentencing, “a 
district court may consider all information adduced during trial, 
including acquitted conduct . . . While a fact-finder is required to find 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentencing court may find facts 
relevant to sentencing by the lower preponderance of the evidence 
standard.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “[A] sentencing court may consider predicate acts 
as relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1 because their commission need 
not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 
 
United States v. Amato, 540 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether attorney fees and accounting costs are “other 
expenses” includable in a restitution order under the Mandatory Victim 
Restitution Act. Id. at 159. 
ANALYSIS: Section (b)(4) of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act 
states that a victim is to be reimbursed “for lost income and necessary 
child care, transportation, and other expenses incurred during 
participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense or 
attendance at proceedings related to the offense.” Id. The court rejected 
the defendant’s two arguments against the inclusion of attorney fees and 
accounting costs as “other expenses” in section (b)(4). First, the court 
found defendants’ ejusdem generis theory, or expenses similar in nature 
argument, without merit. Id. at 160–61. The court noted that ejusdem 
generis is a guide to deciphering legislative intent, not a binding 
doctrine. Id. at 160. Furthermore, the court argued that for ejusdem 
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generis to be applicable, the statutory terms must collectively hold a 
common attribute—a factor absent from in the language of section 
(b)(4). Id. at 160–61. Second, the court found the defendant’s causation 
argument without foundation. Id. at 161–62. According to the court, even 
if a “direct and foreseeable result” test was adopted, the inclusion of 
attorney fees and accounting costs would satisfy that threshold. Id. at 
162. Finally, the court concluded that the plain language of the statute 
grants the courts broad authority in fashioning restitution orders. Id. at 
160. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held “that ‘other expenses’ incurred 
during the victim’s participation in the investigation or prosecution of the 
offense or attendance at the proceeding related to the offense may 
include attorney fees and accounting costs.” Id. at 159. 
 
United States v. Hassan, 542 F.3d 968 (2d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”) was 
unconstitutionally [vague] as it applied to khat, a leaf used to brew tea.” 
Id. at 978. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit addressed the defendant’s argument of 
vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. 
The court relied upon the decisions of the 1st, 6th, and 8th Circuits, 
which all rejected due process challenges to the khat-related regulatory 
scheme in the CSA. Id. The court emphasized that the vagueness 
doctrine requires a statute to “‘give the person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited’ and ‘provide explicit 
standards for those who apply [it].’” Id. In reliance upon other circuit 
court decisions, the court stressed that “what saves the statute at issue 
here—the CSA as it relates to khat—from constitutional trouble is the 
fact that scienter is required for a conviction.” Id. at 978. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that the requirement that the 
government prove that a person “knowingly or intentionally” import or 
distribute khat with cathinone was sufficient to save the statue from 
unconstitutionality. Id. at 979. 
 
Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether “a plaintiff asserting a civil rights claim 
forfeits his psychotherapist-patient privilege by reason of allegations in 
his pleading or answers to questions in discovery.” Id. at 133. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “the Supreme Court made clear 
that the federal courts are required to recognize” psychotherapist-patient 
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privilege, but accepted that the privilege can be waived like any other. Id. 
at 130–31. The court agreed with the analysis of the D.C. Circuit, having 
previously been “presented with precisely these questions” where the 
plaintiff therein also “made no claim for emotional distress and had 
expressly abandoned any such claim.” Id. at 133–34. The court 
analogized “to other testimonial privileges,” finding that privilege is 
waived where the privileged communication is used offensively, but not 
merely acknowledging a mental condition for which the plaintiff does 
not seek recompense, nor “when the plaintiff’s mental state is put in 
issue only by the defendant.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held “that a plaintiff does not forfeit 
his psychotherapist-patient privilege merely by asserting a claim for 
injuries that do not include emotional damage” nor does he “forfeit that 
privilege by merely stating that he suffers from a condition . . . for which 
he does not seek damages; that a plaintiff may withdraw or formally 
abandon all claims for emotional distress in order to avoid forfeiting” the 
privilege; and that the privilege “is not overcome when [the plaintiff’s] 
mental state is put in issue only by another party.” Id. at 134. 
 
Wabtec Corp. v. Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB, 525 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 
2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a motion to dismiss based on an arbitration 
clause can be construed as a motion to compel arbitration, and therefore 
as falling within the parameters of 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C) . . .” Id. at 139. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit joined the D.C. Circuit in refusing to 
treat Wabtec’s motion to dismiss as a motion to compel arbitration. Id. at 
140. The court based its refusal on the fact that Wabtec did not 
“explicitly request the district court to direct that arbitration be held . . . 
[but instead] requested only the dismissal of Faiveley’s application for 
preliminary injunction and expedited discovery.” Id. The 2nd Circuit 
followed the plain language of 9 U.S.C. § 16(a) which states that “the 
denial of a motion to dismiss based on an arbitration clause is not an 
order from which an appeal may be taken.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court determined that under the Federal 
Arbitration Act § 16(a)(1)(C), an order to dismiss based on an arbitration 
clause cannot be construed as a motion to compel arbitration where an 
appellant does “not frame its argument in terms of mandatory arbitration 
but in terms of judicial preclusion.” Id. at 140. 
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Dedji v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether an immigration judge has the discretion to 
“disregard the deadlines imposed” by local immigration court rule 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.31. Id. at 188. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that immigration judges have the 
inherent power to depart from local rules “in certain circumstances where 
fairness demands that noncompliance be excused.” Id. at 192. The court 
explained that where “an alien has demonstrated good cause for the 
failure . . . and substantial prejudice” will result from the strict 
enforcement of a deadline, the judge may exercise its “informed 
discretion.” Id. The court found the immigration judge failed to consider 
whether a departure from the local rules was warranted. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit concluded “where an alien has 
demonstrated good cause for failure to timely file documents” and “strict 
adherence to the local rules would cause unfairness” an Immigration 
Judge may allow for a “reprieve from the filing deadlines set forth in the 
local rules.” Id. at 193. 
 
United States v. Darden, 539 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “Whether a prior state conviction was a conviction for 
a ‘serious drug offense’ within the meaning of the Armed Career 
Criminal Act (“ACCA”), where state law prescribed a maximum 
sentence of at least ten years for the offense at the time of the state 
conviction but state law, prior to federal sentencing, prospectively 
reduced the maximum sentence to less than ten years for the same 
offense conduct.” Id. 120–21. 
ANALYSIS: First, the 2nd Circuit addressed whether current state 
law or the state law in place at the time of the conviction should be used 
in determining the maximum term prescribed for the offense. Id. at 121. 
The court held that sentencing courts should examine the current state 
law because Congress’s use of the present tense in the ACCA signals that 
the state’s current sentencing process is applicable. Id. at 121–22. Then, 
the 2nd Circuit discussed whether “the date of the commission of the 
offense is property regarded as part of the offense . . . for which the 
maximum term is prescribed by law.” Id. at 123. The court distinguished 
a Supreme Court decision, which held “that the increased maximum term 
applicable to recidivists was the maximum term prescribed for the 
offense by state law,” but stated that this dicta did not apply since the act 
112 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 5:99 
in question does not view drug crimes committed before a certain date as 
more serious. Id. at 125–26. Therefore, the court found that “the timing 
of the offense conduct is not part of the offense of conviction to which 
the maximum term is tied for purposes of the ACCA.” Id. at 127. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit concluded that the ACCA leaves no 
ambiguity and the maximum that is prescribed by state law falls under 
the current sentencing scheme. Id. at 128. 
 
Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “Whether an alien subject to a final order of removal 
who files a successive asylum application based only on changed 
personal circumstances must also file a motion to reopen based on 
changed country conditions pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), when 
the ninety-day deadline has passed for such a motion.” Id. at 147. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit discussed whether the existence of a 
liberty or property interest in a discretionary grant of asylum was 
available to an alien who had previously been denied an asylum 
application. Id. at 157. The court agreed with the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ (“BIA”) interpretation of the INA’s relevant statutory 
provisions. Id. at 156. “The Board’s determination that a properly filed 
motion to reopen is a prerequisite to the filing of a new asylum petition 
when the petitioner is under a final removal order has recently been 
affirmed by four other circuits and is based on sound reasoning.” Id. at 
152. The 2nd Circuit agreed with the 7th Circuit that some restrictions 
must be in place to limit manipulation by petitioners for asylum 
applications. Id. at 156. Thus, the 2nd Circuit held that “an alien under a 
final removal order must file a successive asylum application in 
conjunction with a motion to reopen and in accordance with those 
procedural requirements.” Id.   
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit concluded that an alien who has 
previously filed an asylum application and been adjudicated deported 
and has nonetheless remained illegally in the country, does not have a 
property interest in a discretionary grant of asylum. Id. at 157. 
 
Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Under what circumstance may a plaintiff file a 
complaint using a pseudonym and if a party appeals the court’s denial of 
the right to file a complaint using a pseudonym, what standard does the 
appeals court use to review the district court decision. Id. 
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ANALYSIS: Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that parties’ names are included in the title of the complaint in 
order to allow for public scrutiny of judicial proceedings. Id. at 188–89. 
Courts, however, have provided for some exceptions to this requirement. 
Id. If the plaintiff can show that it has a “substantial privacy right” which 
would counteract the need for openness in judicial proceedings, the court 
should permit the use of a pseudonym. Id. at 189. Additionally, courts 
should consider the prejudice to the defendant before permitting a 
plaintiff to use a pseudonym. Id. In order to balance the plaintiff’s right 
to privacy without avoiding prejudice to the defendant, the court 
established a non-exhaustive list of factors that should be considered 
when deciding whether to permit the use of a pseudonym: whether the 
litigation involves matters that are highly sensitive and personal; whether 
identification poses a risk of retaliation; whether identification poses 
other risks and the severity of those harms; whether the plaintiff is 
particularly vulnerable to the harms of disclosure; whether the suit is 
challenging the government or private parties; whether the defendant is 
prejudiced by the use of a pseudonym; whether the plaintiff’s identity 
has been kept confidential; whether the public interest is furthered by 
requiring disclosure; whether the public interest in the identity is 
particularly weak based on the nature of the issues being presented; and 
whether there are any alternative ways to protect the plaintiff. Id. at 189–
90.  This test requires a court to use its discretion based on the factual 
circumstance being presented to it to determine if the use of a 
pseudonym is necessary. Id. at 190. 
CONCLUSION: The district court must balance the party’s interest 
in anonymity with the potential prejudice to the other party when 
determining whether to permit a party to proceed under a pseudonym. Id. 
at 186. The court concluded that the District Court’s denial of plaintiff’s 
request to file under a pseudonym was erroneous, as was its dismissal of 
the complaint and vacated and remanded the decision. Id. at 193. 
 
United States v. Siraj, 533 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether written police reports that memorialized oral 
statements made by a defendant to an undercover officer had to be 
produced on demand under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(B)(i). Id. at 100. 
ANALYSIS: The court analyzed the plain language of Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(B). Id. at 101. The court then noted that 
the language of Rule 16(a)(1)(B) distinguishes between two types of 
“Written or Recorded” statements. Id. “Subsection (i) makes 
discoverable all “relevant written or recorded statement[s] by the 
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defendant” that the prosecutor could reasonably know are within the 
“government’s possession, custody, or control.” Id. Subsection (ii) makes 
discoverable certain portions of “written record[s] containing the 
substance of any relevant oral statement” made by the defendant—if the 
defendant made the statement in response to interrogation by a person 
the defendant knew was a government agent.” Id. at 101. The court relied 
upon “subsection (a)(1)(B)(ii)” in finding that such records need not be 
produced upon demand. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that such reports must not be 
produced upon demand under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
16(a)(1)(B)(i). Id. at 100. 
 
THIRD CIRCUIT  
United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the First Amendment requires disclosure of 
the jurors’ names prior to empanelment of the jury in this criminal trial. 
Id. at 233. 
ANALYSIS: The court examined whether the “experience and logic” 
test established the existence of a First Amendment right of access to 
obtain jurors’ names prior to empanelment of the jury. Id. at 235. The 
court looked at history, and it concluded that “public knowledge of 
jurors’ names is a well-established part of American judicial tradition” 
because “since the development of trial by jury, the process of” jury 
selection has been “a public process with exceptions only for good cause 
shown.” Id. at 235–36. The court reasoned that “knowledge of juror 
identities allows the public to verify the impartiality” of the jurors. Id. at 
238. 
CONCLUSION: The court stated that knowing the identity of jurors 
should occur no later than swearing in and empanelment because 
“corruption and bias should be rooted out” before the trial. Id. at 239. 
 
Pardini v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 524 F.3d 419 (3d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the Individuals with Disabilities in Education 
Act (“IDEA”) “authorizes an award of attorney’s fees to an attorney-
parent who represented his child” in both IDEA administrative 
proceedings and federal court proceedings. Id. at 422. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that “fee-shifting statutes are 
meant to encourage the effective prosecution of meritorious claims,” and 
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“attorney-parents are generally incapable of exercising sufficient 
independent judgment on behalf of their children.” Id. at 422. Because 
fee-shifting provisions serve “as an incentive to retain independent 
counsel,” the court found the rule better served by the denial of attorney 
fees to attorney-parents in IDEA cases. Id. at 425. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that an attorney-parent cannot 
receive attorney fees in the representation of his minor child in IDEA 
administrative proceedings or federal court proceedings. Id. 
 
United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2008) 
Editor’s Note: This case involves two issues of first impression, 
one concerning the Federal Rules of Evidence and the other concerning 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 
 
QUESTION ONE: Whether under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, testimony is considered inconsistent when a witness 
refuses to answer questions that they had previously answered 
unequivocally in evidentiary hearings. Id. at 159. 
ANALYSIS: Addressing the first issue, the Court looked to the plain 
language of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which 
does not consider evidence inadmissible as hearsay if “[t]he declarant 
testifies at trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning 
the statement, and the statement is . . . inconsistent with the declarant’s 
testimony, and was given under oath . . . at a trial, hearing, or other 
proceeding. . . .” Id. at 158. Consistent with its sister courts in the 8th and 
7th Circuits, the 3rd Circuit held that inconsistency may be found not 
only where a witness gives overtly contradictory testimony, but also 
where a witness gives “evasive and rambling responses” to questions that 
had been answered clearly at a prior evidentiary hearing. Id. at 159. The 
court reasoned that “inconsistency is not limited to diametrically opposed 
answers, inability to recall, silence, or changes of position.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that (a) witnesses who refuse to 
clearly answer questions that they had previously answered under oath 
may not have their prior testimony deemed inadmissible as hearsay. Id. 
at 159. 
 
QUESTION TWO: Whether in sentencing a conspirator to drug 
distribution, a court should “exclude from the quantity of drugs seized an 
amount (the conspirator) intended to keep for personal consumption.” Id. 
at 160. 
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ANALYSIS: Turning to the second issue, the court observed that 
commentary to the United States Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) 
explains that a convicted conspirator “is accountable for all quantities of 
contraband with which he was directly involved.” Id. at 160. The 3rd 
Circuit noted that “[e]very circuit to address the question has held that 
where a member of a conspiracy to distribute drugs handles drugs both 
for personal consumption and distribution in the course of the 
conspiracy, the entire quantity of drugs handled is relevant [for 
sentencing purposes].” 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “[d]rugs that a defendant 
earmarks for his personal use” should not “be deducted from the total 
quantity involved in a conspiracy” when calculating a conspirator’s 
sentence. Id. at 160. 
 
Prusky v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 532 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “What constitutes a reasonable substitute for mitigation 
purposes in the context of the breach of an investment contract.” Id. at 
259. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that the view espoused in Teachers 
Insurance and Annuity Association of America v. Ormesa Geothermal 
was well reasoned. Id. The Ormesa Geothermal court found that “a 
reasonable substitute must be one with a similar risk-reward profile to 
that of the opportunity lost as a result of the breach.” Id. “The court 
emphasized that in the mitigation context, an alternative investment 
should have investment characteristics as close as possible to the original 
investment in terms of principal, interest rate, borrower credit rating and 
intended duration.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit concluded that “courts should 
consider the specific nature and characteristics of the performance lost as 
a result of the breach in determining whether a proposed substitute was 
in fact reasonable . . . .”Id. 
 
Mallon v. Trust Company of New Jersey Severance Pay Plan, 282 Fed. 
App’x 991 (3d Cir. 2008) 
Editors’s Note: This case resolves two issues of first impression 
concerning severance administration under ERISA.  
 
QUESTION ONE: Whether the district court erred in reviewing the 
Severance Plan Administrator’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s severance 
claim too deferentially. Id. at 994. 
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ANALYSIS: The court noted that under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (“ERISA”) “if a benefit plan gives discretion to an 
administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, 
that conflict must be weighed as a factor in determining whether there is 
an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 994. However, the 3rd Circuit found that 
the district court had “properly [taken] into account” all of the relevant 
factors that “could have heightened its scrutiny.” Id. 
 
QUESTION TWO: Whether the Severance Plan Administrator erred 
in construing the severance plan in such a way that Plaintiffs were denied 
severance benefits due to their resignations. Id. at 995. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that in reviewing a Plan 
Administrator’s decision it would consider “(1) whether the 
interpretation is consistent with the goals of the Plan; (2) whether it 
renders any language in the Plan meaningless or internally inconsistent; 
(3) whether it conflicts with the substantive or procedural requirements 
of the ERISA statute; (4) whether the [relevant entities have] interpreted 
the provision at issue consistently; and (5) whether the interpretation is 
contrary to the clear language of the Plan.” Id. at 995. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that both the standard of the 
district court’s review and its interpretation of the severance plan were 
not “arbitrary and capricious.” Id. at 997. The court stated that “[e]ven 
under a heightened standard of review, our task is not to substitute our 
view for that of the Plan Administrator.” Id. 
 
 
United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the term “personally” is textually ambiguous 
as included in the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203 § 
14(a), 67 Stat. 400, 406 (2003) prohibiting the issuance of visas to “any 
person who personally advocated or assisted in the persecution of any 
person or group of persons” as applied to the case of an armed Nazi 
concentration camp guard who did not commit atrocities himself. Id. at 
297. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit discerned the meaning of the term 
“personally” by looking first at the “‘plain’ and ‘literal’ language of the 
statute.” Id. The court consulted various dictionary definitions and found 
that the “plain meaning of ‘personally advocated or assisted in the 
persecution of any person’ is that an individual, by his own actions 
performed in person, advocated or assisted in persecution.” Id. The court 
then referred to the decisions of the 7th and 8th Circuits to support its 
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conclusion that an armed guard at a concentration camp “personally 
advocated or assisted in . . . persecution” because “his personal actions 
assisted in keeping the prisoners confined in the camps where they were 
persecuted.” Id. at 297–98. These actions included standing “watch at the 
perimeter of the concentration camps with instructions to fire his rifle if a 
prisoner tried to escape” and “march[ing] prisoners to and from their 
work sites.” Id. at 297. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit concluded that the term 
“personally” is not textually ambiguous as included in the Refugee Relief 
Act § 14(a). Id. 
 
Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia, 527 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether paramedics employed by the City of 
Philadelphia Fire Department have ‘legal authority and responsibility’ 
for fire suppression activities within the meaning of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act [(“FLSA”)], thereby bringing them among the 
exemptions” from overtime pay. Id. at 302. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that under 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) of 
the FLSA an employer must pay an employee “time-and-a-half” 
for all work over 40 hours a week. Id. at 303. However, the court 
added that § 207(k) exempts a “public agency” from subsection 
(a)’s overtime requirements with respect to various categories of 
employees, including individuals engaged in “fire protection 
activities.” Id. For work to qualify as “fire protection activities” the 
worker: (1) must be “trained in fire suppression;” (2) must have 
“legal authority and responsibility to engage in fire suppression;” 
and (3) must be “employed by a fire department.” Id. at 303. The 
court noted that § 203(y) was added to clarify that dual function 
paramedics are to be exempt from the FLSA overtime provision 
and are to be treated as firefighters, whereas paramedics are 
entitled to the time-and-a-half overtime pay. Id. at 318. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that where paramedics do not have 
training in fire suppression, they are not exempted from the overtime 
requirements of § 207(A) of the FLSA. Id. at 319. 
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United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2008) 
Editor’s Note: This case resolves two issues of first impression. 
 
QUESTION ONE: Whether, under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, testimony is considered inconsistent when a witness 
refuses to answer questions that they had previously answered 
unequivocally in evidentiary hearings. Id. at 159. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit concluded that inconsistency may be 
found not only where a witness gives overtly contradictory testimony, 
but also where a witness gives “evasive and rambling responses” to 
questions that had been answered clearly at a prior evidentiary hearing. 
Id. The court reasoned that “inconsistency is not limited to diametrically 
opposed answers, inability to recall, silence, or changes of position.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that witnesses who refuse to 
clearly answer questions that they had previously answered under oath 
may not have their prior testimony deemed inadmissible as hearsay. Id. 
 
QUESTION TWO: Whether, in sentencing a conspirator to drug 
distribution, a court should “exclude from the quantity of drugs seized an 
amount that [the conspirator] intended to keep for personal 
consumption.” Id. at 160. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by looking to the commentary to the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), which explains 
that a convicted conspirator “is accountable for all quantities of 
contraband with which he was directly involved.” Id. at 160. The 3rd 
Circuit noted that “[e]very circuit to address the question has held that 
where a member of a conspiracy to distribute drugs handles drugs both 
for personal consumption and distribution in the course of the 
conspiracy, the entire quantity of drugs handled is relevant [for 
sentencing purposes].” Id. at 160. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit joined the 1st, 7th, 8th, and 10th 
circuits in holding that “[d]rugs that a defendant earmarks for his 
personal use” should not “be deducted from the total quantity involved in 
a conspiracy” when calculating a conspirator’s sentence. Id. at 160. 
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United States v. Whitted, 541 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the Fourth Amendment requires any level 
of suspicion to justify a border search of a passenger cabin aboard a 
cruise liner arriving in the United States from a foreign port.” Id. at 482. 
ANALYSIS: The court acknowledged that “routine” border searches 
“may be conducted . . . [without] any suspicion of wrongdoing,” but 
“nonroutine” border searches require reasonable suspicion to be 
constitutional. Id. at 485. Looking to the decisions of several other 
courts, the 3rd Circuit likened the search of a cruise ship cabin to the 
search of a personal residence more than a vehicle, and found “that the 
search of private living quarters aboard a ship at the functional 
equivalent of a border is a nonroutine border search and must be 
supported by reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 488. The court then 
“consider[ed] the totality of circumstances in determining whether 
reasonable suspicion existed at the time of the search,” and concluded 
that “the facts here support the conclusion that the customs officers 
reasonably suspected [the defendant] of criminal activity.” Id. at 489. 
CONCLUSION: A border search of a passenger cabin is considered 
“nonroutine,” requiring reasonable suspicion to justify such a search. Id. 
at 482. 
 
Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a letter from a Legal Department that 
employs no lawyers is misleading under [15 U.S.C.S. §] § 1692e(3)” of 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). Id. at 222. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that “[a] debt collection 
letter is deceptive where it can be reasonably read to have two or more 
different meanings, one of which is inaccurate.” Id. The court concluded 
that in light of its precedent, “the issue in this case is whether under the 
least sophisticated debtor standard, Unifund’s letter to Rosenau can be 
reasonably read to have two different meanings, one of which is 
inaccurate.” Id. at 223. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “the statute forbids ‘[t]he 
false representation or implication that . . . any communication is from an 
attorney. . . .’ [and therefore] a debt-collection letter can be deceptive 
under the FDCPA even if it only implies that it is from an attorney.” Id. 
at 224. The Court concluded that the district court had misapplied this 
standard and therefore remanded for proceedings therewith. Id. at 225. 
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Swiger v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 540 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “Whether a federal district court has diversity 
jurisdiction over a lawsuit involving a partnership that has among its 
partners an American citizen domiciled in a foreign state.” Id. at 181. 
ANALYSIS: The Supreme Court has consistently applied the 
Chapman rule to establish “[a] partnership’s citizenship for purposes of 
diversity.” Id. at 185. This rule determines a partnership’s citizenship, for 
diversity purposes, “by reference to all partners, and all partners must be 
diverse from all parties on the opposing side.” Id. at 184. “The rule of 
Chapman is a legal construct that allows a real legal entity, though a non-
citizen, to sue and be sued in federal court based upon diversity by 
looking through the partnership to the citizenship of each partner.” Id. at 
185. The 3rd Circuit further noted that “all courts that have addressed 
this issue have held that  . . . an entity [such as the partnership here] does 
not qualify for diversity jurisdiction.” Id. at 181. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit adopted the Chapman rule and held, 
“[w]henever a partnership (or other unincorporated association) brings 
suit or is sued in a federal court, the citizenship of each of its partners (or 
members) must be considered in determining whether diversity 
jurisdiction exists, and all partners (or members) must be diverse from all 
parties on the opposing side.” Id. at 185. 
 
In re APA Transp. Corp. Consol. Litig., 541 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the Plaintiff Funds can be considered 
‘person[s]’ permitted to seek enforcement of the WARN Act pursuant to 
29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5).” Id. at 241. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the relevant provision of the 
WARN Act provides that a civil suit may be brought by “[a] person 
seeking to enforce such liability, including a representative of employees 
or a unit of local government aggrieved under paragraph (1) or (3).” Id. 
at 241. Since the WARN Act failed to define the word “person,” the 
court turned to the “reasonable” regulations promulgated by the 
Department of Labor (“DOL”) pertaining to “Warn Act enforcement.” 
Id. The court cited to 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(d), which permits “[e]mployees, 
their representatives and units of local government” to initiate civil 
actions against “employers believed to be in violation of § 3 of the Act.” 
Id. The court reasoned that since this provision indicated that only 
employees, union representatives and units of local government may 
bring suit, the Court would apply the DOL regulation. Id. 
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CONCLUSION: Under the applicable DOL enforcement regulations, 
the court found that Plaintiff Funds are not “person[s]” that may enforce 
the WARN Act. Id. 
 
Rranci v. Attorney General of the United States, 540 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 
2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime (“Convention”) affects the removal of an 
alien who served as a government witness in the United States if the 
person he made a statement or testified against has threatened his life. Id. 
at 168. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit agreed with a Seton Hall Law School 
amicus brief that the plaintiff, an alien, deserved a chance to reopen his 
case due to his previous lawyer’s ineffectiveness. Id. at 178. The court 
rejected the government’s argument that the Convention introduced no 
new protections for aliens by noting that a senate report and a letter from 
President Bush stated that the law already complied with the convention. 
Id. Thus the court concluded that the absence of implementing legislation 
does not imply that the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has “no 
need to set out how existing law complies with the Convention.” Id. 
Finally, the court ordered that on remand the BIA should determine how 
current law reflects compliance with the specific provisions of the 
Convention that are relevant to the plaintiff’s claim. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit concluded that the possibility that 
an alien was prejudiced by former counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness in 
failing to argue that he was entitled to protection under the Convention 
warranted remand. Id. at 178–79. 
 
Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2008) 
Editor’s Note: This case resolves three issues of first impression 
concerning the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act. 
 
QUESTION ONE: Whether plaintiffs alleging Driver’s Privacy 
Protection Act (“DPPA”) violations are entitled to a jury trial on the 
issue of punitive damages. Id. at 386. 
ANALYSIS: After noting that the DPPA makes no mention of the 
right to a jury trial, the court proceeded to do a Seventh Amendment 
analysis outlined by the Supreme Court. Id. at 388. The court established 
that an action brought under the DPPA was an action in law, rather than 
equity, because it is analogous to common law suits that sought monetary 
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relief and “sounded in tort.” Id. The court then noted that historically, 
punitive damages have always been a jury question. Id. at 389. Lastly, 
the court stated that factual issues such as the defendants’ willfulness or 
recklessness are for juries to determine. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “where there is a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding the willfulness or recklessness of a 
defendant’s conduct, . . . the Seventh Amendment requires a trial by jury 
on the issue of punitive damages under the DPPA.” Id. at 390. 
 
QUESTION TWO: Whether individuals who are not specifically 
identified in a motor vehicle record have standing to bring an action 
under the DPPA. Id. at 390. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit first interpreted the language of the 
DPPA to confer a cause of action only to those individuals “whose 
personal information from their motor vehicle records is at issue.” Id. at 
391. The court focused on the singular form of “individual” to exclude 
any cohabitants of the person listed in the motor vehicle records, such as 
spouses and children. Id. The court then noted that the consent provision 
of the statute also uses the singular “individual,” and the purpose of the 
statute would be frustrated if any cohabitant of the individual could 
waive the individual’s right to privacy under the DPPA. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that individuals who are not 
specifically identified in a motor vehicle record have no standing to sue 
under the DPPA. Id. 
 
QUESTION THREE: “[W]hether the DPPA permits a plaintiff to 
recover two separate liquidated damage awards because a defendant 
obtains and then uses plaintiff’s confidential information.” Id. at 392. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the statute used the term 
“liquidated damages,” which means damages that could reasonably be 
anticipated ex ante. Id. at 393. The court stated that “Congress clearly 
contemplated that in most cases, a defendant who obtained motor vehicle 
information would put it to some use.” Id. The court concluded that the 
minimum amount of liquidated damages stated in the statute 
“encompasses both aspects of a defendant’s breach of the DPPA—one 
instance of obtaining and one of use,” and a contrary holding would 
effectively double the liquidated damages amount in the statute. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that the DPPA permits 
recovery of two separate damage awards, as the liquidated damages 
amount listed in the DPPA encompasses “one instance of obtaining and 
one of use” of private motor vehicle information. Id. 
 
124 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 5:99 
Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus Inc., 527 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the protections generally afforded pregnant 
women under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) also extend to 
women who have decided to have an abortion. Id. at 363. 
ANALYSIS: In accordance with the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Griggs v. Duke Power, the 3rd Circuit gave a high degree of deference to 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines. Id. at 
364. Under these guidelines, the EEOC has determined that “the basic 
principle of the PDA is that women affected by pregnancy and related 
conditions must be treated the same as other applicants and employees 
on the basis of their ability or inability to work.” Id. Therefore a woman 
is “protected against such practices as being fired . . . merely because she 
is pregnant or has had an abortion.” Id. Further, the legislative history of 
the PDA noted that “[b]ecause the PDA applies to all situations in which 
women are affected by pregnancy . . . its basic language covers women 
who chose to terminate their pregnancies. Thus, no employer may . . . 
fire or refuse to hire a woman simply because she has exercised her right 
to have an abortion.” Id. Thus, the court held that “the plain language of 
the statute, together with the EEOC guidelines and legislative history, 
supported the conclusion that an employer may not discriminate against a 
woman employee because she exercised her right to have an abortion.” 
Id. The court also determined that the phrase “related medical 
conditions” used in the statute includes abortions. Id. 
CONCLUSION: A woman employee may not be discriminated 
against by her employer because she has elected to terminate her 
pregnancy, as the PDA clearly protects such women from discrimination. 
Id. 
 
United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54 (3d Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether possessing child pornography is a lesser-
included offense of receiving child pornography, and thus that 18 
U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) punish the 
same offense. Id. at 70–71. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that there is a rebuttable presumption 
where two statutory provisions proscribe the same offense that a 
legislature does not intend to impose two punishments for that offense. 
Id. at 70. Additionally, the court noted that if two statutory provisions 
proscribe the same offense and it is not clear that the legislature intended 
multiple punishments for the offense, then the double jeopardy clause 
protects a defendant from being convicted under both provisions. Id. 
Here, the defendant argued that a provision prohibiting receipt of child 
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pornography and a provision prohibiting possession of child pornography 
proscribed the same offense. Id. at 71. For the purposes of double 
jeopardy, two offenses are the same if one is a lesser-included offense of 
the other under the “same elements” test. Id. Under this test, if the 
elements of both offenses are the same, then they are the same offense. 
Id. Although the 3rd Circuit had not previously considered whether 
section 2252A(a)(5)(B) punished a lesser-included offense of section 
2252A(a)(2), the court indicated that, “as a general matter, possession of 
a contraband item is a lesser-included offense of receipt of the item.” Id. 
The Supreme Court has held that, in the case of receiving and possessing 
firearms, “Congress seems clearly to have recognized that a felon who 
receives a firearm must also possess it, and thus had no intention of 
subjecting that person to two convictions for the same criminal act.” Id. 
Here, the 3rd Circuit next examined 9th and 6th Circuit cases that stated, 
in dicta, that section 2252A(a)(5)(B) did indeed punish a lesser-included 
offense of section 2252A(a)(2). Finding these rationales to be 
controlling, the 3rd Circuit held that Miller’s separate convictions for 
both receiving and possessing child pornography violated the double 
jeopardy clause. Id. at 58. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that possessing child 
pornography is a lesser-included offense of receiving child pornography 
and vacated the defendant’s conviction. Id. 
 
FOURTH CIRCUIT  
United States v. Armstead, 524 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the term “retail value” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 
2319(b)(1) (“The Copyright Act”) is determined by “the price a willing 
buyer would pay a willing seller” at the time of the violation or the 
highest of “face value, par value, or market value.” Id. at 443–44.   
ANALYSIS: The court examined § 2311 of The Copyright Act 
stating “value is measured not only by the actual transactions . . . but also 
by face or par values assigned to commodities or goods before reaching 
the market, and the statute instructs that the greatest of those values be 
used.” Id. at 445. The court also noted that the House Committee Report 
confirmed that “courts may look to the suggested retail price, the 
wholesale price, the replacement cost . . . or financial injury” in 
determining “retail value.” Id. at 446. 
CONCLUSION:  The 4th Circuit concluded that retail value 
“refers to the greatest of any face value, par value, or marker value of 
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commodities or goods in reference to actual or potential sales to ultimate 
consumers.” Id. at 445. 
 
Tidewater Fin. Co. v. Kenney, 531 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the “‘hanging paragraph’ in 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1325(a) . . . prevents a creditor with a purchase money security interest 
in a ‘910 vehicle’ from exercising his contractual right to an unsecured 
claim for the portion of the debt not covered by the sale of such vehicle . 
. . after the vehicle is surrendered to the creditor by a Chapter 13 debtor 
pursuant to section 1325(a)(5)(C).” Id. at 314. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “section 506(a) specifies how 
an ‘allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property’ should be 
valued by providing a method of bifurcating, or dividing, a consumer’s 
debt into secured and unsecured amounts . . . .” Id. at 316–317. The court 
further reasoned that “section 506 is not the exclusive method for 
separating out the deficiency as an unsecured portion of a 910 claim.” Id. 
at 320. As a result of the amendment to the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, “section 506 is no longer 
applicable to 910 claims,” and the court therefore found “no other 
bifurcation method in the Bankruptcy Code nor a rule in the Code which 
qualifies or eliminates a 910 creditor’s contractual entitlement to a 
deficiency claim under state law.” Id. at 320. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that the “hanging paragraph 
does not operate to deprive such undersecured ‘910 creditors’ of their 
deficiency claims because the parties are bound to their contractual rights 
and obligations under operative state law, and the Bankruptcy Code does 
not command otherwise.” Id. at 314. 
 
United States v. Chacon, 533 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether a sex offense perpetrated in the absence of 
consent, and which does not have as an element the use, attempted use, 
or threatened use of physical force, constitutes a “crime of violence” 
under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 254. 
ANALYSIS: Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manuel § 2L1.2, 
a rape offense is a crime of violence if it: (1) constitutes a forcible sex 
offense; (2) has as an element “the use, attempted use, or threatened use 
of physical force against” another person; or (3) otherwise falls within 
the “crime of violence” definition. Id. In order to determine whether the 
rape statute in the instant case constituted a “crime of violence,” the 
Fourth Circuit utilized the “categorical approach” by examining whether 
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the full range of conduct covered under the statute falls within the scope 
of the Guidelines provision. Id. Under Md. Code Ann. art. 27 § 463, a 
second-degree rape offense can be committed if a person engages in 
vaginal intercourse with another: (1) by force or threat of force; or (2) 
with a person who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or 
physically helpless, and the person performing the act knows or 
reasonably should know of such disability; or (3) with a person who is 
under 14 years of age and defendant is at least four years older than the 
victim. Id. at 255. 
The court held that the first and third subparts of the statute plainly 
constituted a crime of violence, but examined the second subpart more 
carefully. The court recognized that the second subpart can be violated 
without the use or threat of physical force, and noted that other circuits 
are split on the issue of whether a sexual offense perpetrated without 
consent, but also without the element of physical force nevertheless 
constitutes a “forcible sex offense” and thus, a “crime of violence” under 
the Guidelines. Id. at 256. The court looked to the definition of the term 
“forcible” for its analysis, ultimately concluding that a “forcible sex 
offense” may be accomplished in the absence of physical force because 
force can be effected through power or pressure, which do not 
necessarily have physical components. Id. at 257. This meaning of a 
“forcible sex offense” is also supported by the fact that there are other 
offenses identified in the Guideline’s definition of “crime of violence” 
that to do have physical force as an element. Id. at 258. Accordingly, 
second-degree rape, accomplished by taking advantage of someone who 
is physically helpless or incapacitated, would also readily constitute a 
“crime of violence.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The Fourth Circuit held that a sex offense 
perpetrated in the absence of consent, whether or not that offense has 
physical force as an element, is a “forcible sex offense” encompassed 
within the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines definition of a “crime of 
violence.” Id. 
 
Afanwi v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 788 (4th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
must rescind and reissue an order of removal when a petitioning alien 
fails to receive an order of removal “through no fault of the BIA.” Id. at 
794. 
ANALYSIS: The court followed the 7th Circuit’s reasoning in 
Firmansjah v. Ashcroft, which held that the BIA is always free to enter a 
new removal order that would then permit a new petition to be 
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submitted. Id. The court noted that in Firmansjah the petitioning alien 
received an order of removal after “the deadline to file a petition for 
review had passed.” Id. It found no fault in the 7th Circuit’s refusal to 
say that the BIA must reissue an order when a notice arrives late. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held “that the decision to rescind and 
reissue an order of removal is properly left to the discretion of the BIA,” 
including where a petitioner fails to receive an order and the BIA did not 
cause this failure. Id. 
 
United States v. Poole, 531 F.3d 263 2008 (4th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether a district court properly exercises jurisdiction 
over a habeas petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) based upon a 
“temporary custody arrangement.” Id. at 264. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that when a habeas petition filed under 
§ 2255 “‘appears . . . inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the] 
detention,’” a federal prisoner is entitled to seek habeas relief under § 
2241 in the district court of his confinement. Id. at 270. Stating that the § 
2241 petition “should name as respondent ‘the person who has custody 
over [the prisoner],’” the court utilized the Supreme Court’s “immediate 
custodian rule” of Rumsfeld v. Padilla to establish that “a district court 
properly exercises jurisdiction over a habeas petition whenever it has 
jurisdiction over the petitioner’s custodian.” Id. at 270–71. The court 
further noted that, in a similar context, “the writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum . . . works a ‘mere [] loan[] [of] the prisoner to federal 
authorities’” and does not alter the petitioner’s custodian. Id. at 271. 
Relying on the fact that “the writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum 
and habeas corpus ad testificandum are derived from adjacent language 
in the same statutory subsection” of § 2241(c)(5), the court stated that “it 
is reasonable to believe that the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 
would likewise be a ‘mere[] loan[]’ that does not effect a change in 
custody.” Id. The court further noted that since “‘[f]ederal courts are 
courts of limited jurisdiction’ . . . [a] court is to presume, therefore, that a 
case lies outside its limited jurisdiction unless and until jurisdiction has 
been shown to be proper.” Id. at 274. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the issuance of a writ of habeas 
corpus ad testificandum did not “transmute[] [the petitioner’s] temporary 
presence in the district into a permanent stay that effected a change in 
custodian.” Id. at 271. As such, the district court did not have proper 
jurisdiction over the matter. Id. at 275. 
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FIFTH CIRCUIT  
Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404 
(5th Cir. Tex. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether “exigent circumstances” exist that would 
permit state child protective services to enter a home without a warrant in 
situations involving neither unusual circumstances nor immediate danger 
to the child. Id. at 419. 
ANALYSIS: Although the Fourth Amendment protects against 
warrantless searches of a person’s home, the Supreme Court has 
recognized an “exigent circumstances” exception wherein “[l]aw 
enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render 
emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant 
from imminent injury.” Id. at 421. The 10th Circuit has held that where 
“there [is] nothing particularly unusual about the child’s condition at the 
time he was removed [from the home], and the child’s attending 
physician told the [social workers] that it would be a mistake to remove 
the child,” no exigent circumstances exist. Id. at 422. In Gates, the 5th 
Circuit reasoned that where “the only evidence of danger to the . . . 
children was a one-time incident involving only [one of the children] and 
[the use of] questionable discipline methods” of physical exercise, the 
facts “do not give rise to an immediate danger.” Id. at 423. 
CONCLUSION: Where there is a lack of immediate physical danger 
to the child, along with a lack of evidence of serious physical abuse, the 
5th Circuit will not apply the “exigent circumstances” exception to the 
Fourth Amendment’s protection against warrantless searches. Id.  
 
United States v. Arami, 536 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea 
before the district court formally accepts that plea.” Id. at 479. 
ANALYSIS: Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d) provides, “A 
defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere: (1) before 
the court accepts the plea, for any reason or no reason . . . .” Id. at 480. 
Defendant asserted that he had an absolute right to withdraw his guilty 
plea before the district court formally accepted that plea. Id. at 481. His 
claim that the district court violated Rule 11(d)(1) was subject to plain 
error review. Id. at 482. The record revealed, and the government 
conceded, that the district court did not accept defendant’s plea until 
130 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 5:99 
eight days after he submitted his motion to withdraw. Id. at 481. Under 
the clear language of Rule 11(d)(1), he had an absolute right to withdraw 
his plea, and the district court erred in denying defendant’s request to do 
so. Id. There are four steps in a plain error analysis. Id. at 483. An 
appellate court must initially determine “whether (1) the district court 
committed error, (2) the error is clear and obvious, and (3) the error 
affects substantial rights. If those three conditions are present, an 
appellate court still cannot reverse the conviction unless the error 
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.” Id. Here, defendant easily satisfied the first two prongs of 
the plain error analysis. Id. Additionally, he showed that the error 
affected his substantial rights, thereby satisfying the third prong. Id. at 
484. Finally, denying defendant his right to a jury trial seriously affected 
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 
485. 
CONCLUSION: The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure afford a 
defendant the right to withdraw his guilty plea before the district court 
formally accepts that plea. Id. at 479. The district court committed plain 
error in denying defendant’s motion. Id. at 485. The court reversed the 
judgment of the district court, and the case was remanded for defendant 
to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial. Id. 
 
CleanCOAlition v. TXU Power, 536 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2008) 
Editor’s Note: This case involves two issues of first impression 
concerning the Clean Air Act. 
 
QUESTION ONE: Whether § 7604(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act 
(“CAA”) authorizes citizen suits to redress alleged pre-permit, 
preconstruction, pre-operation CAA violations. Id. at 469. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit addressed the first question by looking 
to the language of the statute, and noted that §7604(f)(3) authorizes 
citizen suits for violations of “any condition or requirement of a permit,” 
not “any condition or requirement to obtain a permit.” Id. at 475 
(emphasis in original). The court also observed that regardless of 
whether or not § 7604(f)(4) includes preconstruction requirements, a 
defendant cannot violate these requirements “simply by filing an 
incomplete permit application, in response to which a permit may or may 
not issue, especially when the permit process is still pending and subject 
to state judicial review.” Id. at 477.  
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CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit concluded that § 7604(a)(1) does 
not authorize citizen suits to redress alleged pre-permit, preconstruction, 
pre-operation CAA violations. Id. at 478. 
 
QUESTION TWO: Whether § 7604(a)(3) authorizes preconstruction 
citizen suits against facilities that either have obtained a permit or are in 
the process of doing so.” Id. 478. 
ANALYSIS: Turning to the second issue, the court looked to the 
language of § 7604(a)(3), which authorizes citizen suits “when an entity 
proposes to construct or constructs a facility without a permit 
whatsoever.” Id. at 478–79. As such, the statute does not authorize 
preconstruction citizen suits unless a permit has already been obtained. 
Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that § 7604(a)(3) does not 
authorize preconstruction citizen suits against facilities that have either 
obtained a permit or are in the process of doing so.” Id. at 478. 
 
Cooper v. Comm’r, No. 07-10761, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12193 (5th 
Cir. June 6, 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) can 
raise, and the district court can accept, a new argument on appeal that the 
IRS did not raise at any time during the administrative proceedings over 
the same claim. Id. at *8–10. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit noted the taxpayer’s assertion that the 
district court, in allowing the IRS to assert “for the first time, new 
reasons to deny [his] claim for refund . . . not asserted in the 
administrative proceedings” violated his constitutional rights. Id. at *8–9. 
However, the court found that the taxpayer did not provide any support 
for this assertion, failing to cite the Constitution or “even a single case.” 
Id. The court determined this failure to provide any support for a claim 
constituted the forfeiture of the right to subsequently assert that same 
objection. Id. The court then noted that where “exceptional 
circumstances” are shown, it would allow the party to assert the forfeited 
claim; however, there were no such circumstances in the present case. Id. 
at *9–10. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that because the party forfeited 
his right to make this argument on appeal and there were no 
extraordinary circumstances present, the government was able to raise a 
new argument on appeal that it did not assert during the administrative 
proceedings. Id. at *10–11. 
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Peres v. Sherman (In re Peres), 530 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether an 11 U.S.C.S. § 341(a) creditors’ meeting is 
concluded where there is no formal announcement of a continuation date. 
Id. at 377. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit adopted the majority position and 
declined to adopt the bright-line rule “that a meeting of creditors is not 
concluded until such time as the trustee so declares or the court so orders. 
Id. at 378. The Court reasoned that “[s]uch a holding ignores the clearly-
established policy of the Bankruptcy Code of encouraging promptness in 
the filing of objections to exemptions, because it would permit a trustee 
to continue a meeting of creditors indefinitely.”  Id. Such a strict rule 
could “impede justice in complex cases where a trustee needs further 
time and information to fully understand a debtor’s financial affairs.” Id. 
The court instead chose to adopt a more flexible case-by-case approach 
and enumerated four factors to consider in determining “the 
reasonableness of a trustee’s delay in adjourning a meeting of creditors: 
(1) the length of the delay; (2) the complexity of the estate; (3) the 
cooperativeness of the debtor; and (4) the existence of any ambiguity 
regarding whether the trustee continued or concluded the meeting.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: A § 341(a) creditors’ meeting can conclude without 
a formal announcement or continuation date so long as the Trustee acts 
reasonably and the debtor is not prejudiced. Id. 
 
In re: Katrina Canal Litigation Breaches. Louisiana v. AAA Ins., 524 
F.3d 700 (5th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the State [of Louisiana] can extend [its 
immunity from federal process] to private citizens of the State,” when the 
State is suing citizens of other states “in its own courts to enforce its own 
laws.” Id. at 707. 
ANALYSIS: The Fifth Circuit first noted that the State enjoys “some 
measure of insulation” from federal process when suing as plaintiff in its 
own courts to enforce its own laws. Id. The court next sought to 
determine the scope of sovereign immunity enjoyed by the states by 
examining the “intersection of Article III, Section 2 of the 
Constitution…and the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. The majority of case 
law examining “immunity’s purpose…have all focused on the 
importance of protecting states as defendants, as did the Founders’ 
debates over Article III.” Id. at 709. The court noted that the Tenth 
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Circuit has held that, “‘a [s]tate cannot assert Eleventh Amendment 
immunity to bar the removal of a suit it has brought,’” but concluded that 
there is no case precedent or “founding history that speak directly to the 
issue at hand.” Id. at 711. 
CONCLUSION: The Fifth Circuit did not answer the question of 
whether a state can invoke Eleventh Amendment immunity preventing 
removal of suit it commenced to federal court. Rather, the court, 
presuming a threshold level of government, concluded that such 
immunity “cannot be conferred by the State upon the prosecution of suits 
by private citizens . . . that the State cannot pull these citizens under its 
claimed umbrella of protection in frustration of a congressional decision 
to give access to federal district courts to defendants exposed to these 
private claims.” Id. As such, the court affirmed the district court’s denial 
of remand to state court. 
 
Harvey v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542 F.3d 1077 (5th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “Whether, for purposes of federal diversity 
jurisdiction, a limited liability company (“LLC”) is a citizen of the state 
where it is organized or is a citizen of the states of which its members are 
citizens.” Id. at 1078. 
ANALYSIS: Relying on the conclusions reached by all other federal 
appellate courts that have addressed the issue, the Fifth Circuit held that, 
like limited partnerships and other unincorporated entities, the 
citizenship of a LLC is determined by the citizenship of all of its 
members. Id. at 1079–80. 
CONCLUSION: The citizenship of an LLC is not treated as a 
corporation for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 1080. Rather, the 
citizenship is determined by the citizenship of all of its members. Id. 
 
Abbott v. Abbott, 542 F.3d 1081 (5th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether “ne exeat orders and statutory ne exeat 
provisions . . . create ‘rights of custody’ under the Hague Convention.” 
Id. at 1084. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “[t]hree federal appellate 
courts have determined” that such rights are not created. Id. Next, the 
court pointed to the 2nd Circuit’s reasoning that “a ne exeat veto right is 
only a partial power—in other words, only one of a bundle of residence-
determining rights,” and that such right is not “an affirmative right to 
determine the child’s residence.” Id. at 1085. The court then noted the 
11th Circuit’s rejection of the 2nd Circuit’s reasoning, finding that the 
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language of the ne exeat provision therein provided for joint parental 
responsibility in matters relating to the child, and thus rights of custody. 
Id. at 1085–86. The 5th Circuit ultimately found the 2nd Circuit’s 
“reasoning that the Hague Convention clearly distinguishes between 
‘rights of custody’ and ‘rights of access’” persuasive. Id. at 1087. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held “that ne exeat rights, even 
when coupled with ‘rights of access,’ do not constitute ‘rights of 
custody’ within the meaning of the Hague Convention.” Id. at 1087. 
 
Bernhard Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. St. Paul Companies, No. 07-
30905, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 17195 (5th Cir. Aug. 8, 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the peremptory bar of La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 9:5606 for insurance agents, brokers, solicitors, or similar licensees 
applies to insurers by virtue of the insurance agent’s actions. Id. at *9. 
ANALYSIS: In holding that the peremptory bar for § 9:5606 did not 
apply to claims against an insurer, the court was guided by the Louisiana 
Civil Code as well as “basic cannons of statutory construction.” Id. at 
*9–10. The 5th Circuit stated that “by its terms, § 9:5606 applies only to 
actions for damages against an ‘insurance agent, broker, solicitor, or 
other similar licensee,’ [and] it is undisputed that an insurance company 
is neither an insurance agent, broker, or solicitor.” Id. at *10. The court 
differentiated between insurers and “other licensees,” noting that insurers 
are “not required to obtain an insurance agent’s license,” thus barring 
their inclusion from the category of “other licensees.” Id. at *12. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “the peremptory bar of 
§ 9:5606 does not apply to claims against an insurer merely because 
those claims rely on imputing the conduct of an agent to the insurer.” Id. 
at *10. 
 
United States v. Molina, 530 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether a prosecutor’s option to prosecute an 
underlying crime as either an independent substantive criminal offense, 
or to instead use the underlying crime as a factor in requesting an 
enhanced sentence for the primary crime is permissible under the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines when the resulting prison time is different. Id. at 
329–30. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit found persuasive the holdings of 
several other circuit courts that had previously been presented with the 
same issue. Id. at 330. In those cases, the defendants challenged their 
sentences, arguing that the Sentencing Guidelines were “invalid” because 
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the prosecutor’s discretion to choose between pursuing the independent 
charge and pursuing the sentencing enhancement for the same conduct 
created a sentencing disparity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Id. 
The 2nd, 7th, and 8th Circuits held that the Sentencing Commission was 
fully aware of such disparities when drafting the Guidelines, and that a 
prosecutor’s power to choose between the two options is properly based 
on his or her evaluation of the strength of the case, and does not violate 
the statutory goal of “avoid[ing] unwarranted sentence disparities. Id. 
The 2nd and 8th Circuit decisions held that a defendant does not have the 
right to choose the penalty scheme under which he will be sentenced, as 
long as the government’s choice is not based on an unjustifiable standard 
such as race or religion. Id. 
The 5th Circuit then noted two legal principles that underlie the 
decisions of its sister circuits, and which it found congruent with its own 
case law. Id. at 331–32. The first was that significant deference is to be 
given to prosecutorial discretion in the absence of actual vindictiveness 
or an equal protection violation. Id. at 332. The second principle 
pertained to Molina’s argument that Congress did not intend for a person 
convicted of both drug trafficking and weapons possession to be 
imprisoned longer than the mandatory sentence for the drug trafficking 
offense alone, absent aggravating circumstances. Id. However, the court 
found that the plain language of the Sentencing Guidelines indicated that 
such punishment shall be “in addition to the punishment provided for 
[the underlying] crime of violence or drug trafficking.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that there was no inconsistency or 
internal contradiction in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, despite the 
disparity of a sentence depending on whether certain criminal conduct 
was treated as a separate offense or as a factor to argue for an enhanced 
sentence. Id. The court determined that the plain language of the statute, 
intended for a weapons possession sentence to be in addition to the 
sentence for the underlying crime of drug trafficking. Id. 
 
SIXTH CIRCUIT  
 
Hereford v. Warren, 536 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the state court unreasonably declined to 
apply the rule of structural error to this lawyer-less stage in Hereford’s 
criminal trial, or whether it reasonably held that Hereford must point to 
actual prejudice arising from his counsel’s absence to obtain relief.” Id. 
at 527. 
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ANALYSIS: The court stated that the “denial of counsel at a ‘critical 
stage’ of the criminal proceedings,” entitles the defendant to a new trial. 
Id. at 529. In order to determine if an event is a critical stage, the court 
looked at the following factors: “steps that hold ‘significant 
consequences for the accused;’ where ‘[a]vailable defenses may be 
irretrievably lost if not then and there asserted;’ where ‘rights are 
perceived or lost;’ when counsel’s presence is ‘necessary to mount a 
meaningful defense;’ and where ‘potential substantial prejudice to 
defendant’s rights inheres in the confrontation . . . and where counsel can 
help avoid that prejudice.’” Id. at 529–30. Applying this test, the court 
concluded that the ex parte communication was not at a critical stage in 
the criminal proceedings. Id. at 533. Therefore, the proceeding did not 
require the rule of structural error because the communication was a 
“brief, administrative conference” that did not hold “significant 
consequences for the accused.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “the state court reasonably ruled 
that the ex parte communication” between the trial judge and the 
prosecutor “did not involve a critical stage and that any error arising 
from defense counsel’s absence was harmless.” Id. at 533. 
 
John B. v. Goetz, 531 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether a party served with an order to compel 
forensic imaging orders, which include confidential medical information 
of non-parties, is entitled to mandamus relief. Id. at 457. 
ANALYSIS: In examining whether the orders were narrowly tailored 
to the information sought, the court reasoned that “the compelled 
forensic imaging orders here fail to account properly for the significant 
privacy and confidentiality concerns . . . .” Id. at 460. The court noted 
that “the media at issue will almost certainly contain confidential state or 
private personal information that is wholly unrelated to the litigation” 
and any order compelling such forensic imaging “must be premised on 
an interest significant enough to override that risk.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that the interests at stake did not 
outweigh the risk because “forensic imaging is not the only available 
means by which . . . [a] court may respond to what it perceives to be 
discovery misconduct” and that mandamus review is an appropriate form 
of appellate review. Id. 
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Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the delivery of confidential information about 
an employer by an employee pursuing a class-action lawsuit, in violation 
of the employer’s privacy policy, is considered protected activity under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 721. 
ANALYSIS: The court first found that the plaintiff’s activity did not 
constitute participation, as defined under Title VII, in the class-action 
lawsuit, so as to protect that activity. Id. at 722. The court reasoned that 
if plaintiff’s conduct were “protected participation in the [class-action] 
lawsuit,” then employees would have “near-immunity for their actions in 
connection with antidiscrimination lawsuits . . . even when they 
knowingly provide irrelevant, confidential information solely to jog their 
memory regarding instances of alleged retaliation.” Id. In finding the 
plaintiff’s conduct unprotected as opposition to unlawful conduct under 
Title VII, the court weighed factors including “how the documents were 
obtained, to whom the documents were produced, the content of the 
documents, . . . why the documents were produced, . . . the scope of the 
employer’s privacy policy, and the ability of the employee to preserve 
the evidence in a manner that does not violate the employer’s privacy 
policy.” Id. at 726. Finally, the court determined that “balance must be 
achieved between the employer’s recognized, legitimate need to maintain 
an orderly workplace and to protect confidential business and client 
information, and the equally compelling need of employees to be 
properly safeguarded against retaliatory actions.” Id. at 727. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that when an employee intentionally 
and unnecessarily produces confidential documents for the purpose of 
recalling allegedly discriminatory acts by the employer, and alternative 
methods are available to accomplish the same goal, the employee does 
not partake in “the kind of reasonable opposition activity that justifies 
violating a company’s privacy policy.” Id. at 727.  
 
Jerman v. Carlisle, 538 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether use of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C.S. § 1692, bona fide error defense applies to 
mistakes of law, or is limited to procedural or clerical errors. Id. at 471. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit referred to a recent decision handed 
down by the 10th Circuit in Johnson v. Riddle regarding 15 U.S.C.S. 
§ 1692. Id. at 473.  There, the 10th Circuit rejected the argument that the 
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FDCPA bona fide error defense was similar to the bona fide error 
defense provided in the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). Id. at 474. The 
10th Circuit explained that TILA explicitly limited the bona fide error 
defense to clerical errors. Id. The Johnson court concluded “that unlike 
the TILA the plain language of the FDCPA suggests no intent to limit the 
bona fide error defense to clerical errors.” Id. Agreeing with the 10th 
Circuit, the court also held that “absent a clearer indication that Congress 
meant to limit the defense to clerical errors, we instead adhere to the 
unambiguous language of the statute as supported by the available 
legislative history.” Id. at 476. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit agreed with the “persuasive 
reasoning and analysis set forth in Johnson,” and held that the “FDCPA’s 
bona fide error defense applies to mistakes of law.” Id. 
 
Bryant v. Dollar General Corp., 538 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the statutory text of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2615, and its implementing 
regulations prohibit employers from retaliating against employees who 
take FMLA leave. Id. at 396. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit refers to the “overwhelming consensus 
of the case law in the circuits as well as the nature of the statutory 
scheme and the FMLA’s legislative history [that] weigh strongly in favor 
of rejecting [the] argument that the FMLA itself does not prohibit 
retaliating against an employee who exercises FMLA leave.” Id. at 400. 
The court stated that FMLA requires employers to restore the employee 
after they return to the position of employment they held prior to the 
commencement of the leave. Id. at 401. “Interpreting § 2615(a)(2)’s ban 
on discrimination in a manner that would permit employers to fire 
employees for exercising FMLA leave would undoubtedly run contrary 
to Congress’s purpose in passing the FMLA.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit concluded that “the FMLA itself 
prohibits employers from taking adverse employment actions against 
employees based on the employee’s exercise of FMLA leave.” Id. 
 
 
United States v. Bass, 274 Fed. Appx. 443 (6th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “Whether an offense charged under Mich. Comp. 
Laws. (“MCL”) § 750.479 categorically qualifies as a crime of violence” 
in the context of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Id. at 448. 
ANALYSIS: Michigan criminalizes assaulting, battering, 
obstructing, or endangering an officer performing his or her duties. Id. In 
2008] First Impressions 139 
analyzing what constitutes a crime of violence, the 6th Circuit previously 
held that “neither actual violence nor an imminent threat of violence 
must occur before an offense can qualify as a crime of violence under 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Id. at 449. The court acknowledged that the 
proper inquiry is whether “the conduct encompassed by the elements of 
the offense, in the ordinary case, presents a serious potential risk of 
injury to another.” Id. The 6th Circuit analyzed MCL § 750.479 and 
found that the statute encompasses both conduct that possibly “presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another” and conduct that does 
not. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that a prior conviction under MCL § 
750.479 “cannot categorically qualify as a crime of violence.” Id. 
 
Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F.3d 597 
(6th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the circuit court has jurisdiction over an 
interlocutory appeal, pursuant to § 16(a)(1) of the Federal Arbitration 
Act (“Act”), of the district court’s denial of a motion for a stay pending 
arbitration (§ 3) under the Act, when the moving parties are not 
signatories to a arbitration agreement, as required under the Act. Id. at 
599–600. 
ANALYSIS: The Federal Arbitration Act provides interlocutory 
appellate jurisdiction to review denials of a motion to stay or to compel 
arbitration under the Act. Id. at 600. Here, defendants moved, pursuant to 
§ 3 of the Act, for a stay pending arbitration. Id. at 598. The motion was 
denied and the defendants sought an interlocutory appeal pursuant to § 
16(a)(1) of the Act. Id. Section 3 of the Act requires that the parties have 
“an agreement in writing” in order to seek a stay. Id. at 600. Defendants 
were not signatories to a written arbitration agreement, but argued that 
they were entitled a stay under a theory of equitable-estoppel because the 
plaintiffs had a written arbitration agreement with Bricolage Capital 
regarding the same issue. Id. at 600.  The court noted that the 2nd Circuit 
has endorsed this theory of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction under 
equitable-estoppel, whereas the D.C. and 10th Circuits have rejected this 
rationale. Id. at 600–02. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit joined the D.C. and 10th Circuits in 
finding, based upon the plain language of the statute, that there must be a 
written arbitration agreement between the parties in order for the circuit 
courts to have interlocutory jurisdiction over denials of motions made 
pursuant to Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. at 602. 
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United States v. Gray, 521 F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether “certain evidence obtained through court-
authorized electronic surveillance pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III), 18 U.S.C.S. 
§§ 2510–22, was properly admitted at trial and, concomitantly, whether 
the district court abused its discretion by refusing to require disclosure of 
certain illegally intercepted conversations of defendants.” Id. at 520. 
ANALYSIS: The court agreed with the defendants argument “that 
here, as in [United States v. Brock], the [certain] conduct underlying their 
convictions is not within the scope of the Hobbs Act.” Id. at 535. The 
defendants contended, “the evidence, at best, alleges a scheme to bribe 
state officials, but does not demonstrate that defendants conspired with, 
or aided and abetted, public officials in obtaining ‘property from 
another,’ a third party.” Id. Defendants assert that “no third party was 
ever coerced or asked to make a payment in return for an official act; 
instead, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government, payments were made directly by defendants to public 
officials to gain favor and to improve their lot as consultants.” Id. The 
court reasoned that it is their duty “to evaluate the proofs pertaining to 
the discrete transactions in three different cities that are the bases of the 
Hobbs Act convictions against defendants.” Id. The court, relying on 
their decision in Brock, opined that, “where, as here, the government 
charges private individuals with Hobbs Act violations under a color of 
official right theory, it must satisfy the ‘property from another’ and ‘with 
his consent’ requirements of § 1951(b)(2).” Id. at 541. “The government 
did not meet this burden with respect to the charges against Gray in 
Counts 30, 31, and 41, and with respect to the charge against Jackson in 
Count 41.” Id. The court reversed the convictions on these counts, yet 
affirmed the remainder concluding “defendants’ remaining assignments 
of error concerning their Hobbs Act convictions are unfounded.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court reversed the defendant Gray’s convictions 
“as to Counts, 30, 31, and 41 [conspiring to obstruct interstate commerce 
by extortion and obstructing interstate commerce] of the superseding 
indictment… [and] affirm[ed] the defendant’s convictions and sentences 
pertaining to all remaining counts.” Id. at 520, 544. The court “reverse[d] 
[defendant Jackson’s] conviction on Count 41 [obstructing interstate 
commerce by extortion] only, but affirm[ed] in all other respects.” Id. 
Accordingly, [the court] “affirm[ed] in part, reverse[d] in part, and 
remand[ed] both defendants’ cases for resentencing consistent with this 
opinion.” Id. at 544. 
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Winget v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 537 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether a bankruptcy court’s final sale order is a final 
decision on the merits for the purpose of applying res judicata. Id. 
ANALYSIS: The court held that “a bankruptcy court’s sale order is a 
final order for res judicata purposes.” Id. at 578. The court reached this 
decision by examining prior holdings that confirmed reorganization in a 
bankruptcy proceeding is a final order, and considering the policy 
matters behind res judicata. Id. The 6th Circuit noted that “public policy 
dictates that there be an end of litigation.” Id. The execution of sale 
order, the court reasons, constitutes an end to litigation by mandating the 
sale of the debtor’s assets and prohibiting further litigation regarding 
those assets absent the court undoing the sale. Id. at 578–79. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit concluded that for res judicata 
purposes, a bankruptcy court’s sale order is a final order. Id. at 578. 
 
Great Lakes Exploration Group, LLC v. Unidentified Wrecked & 
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 522 F.3d 682 (6th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether a salvor, conscious of a shipwreck’s precise 
location, must disclose such information to the state pursuant to the 
Abandoned Shipwreck Act (“ASA”). Id. at 689. 
ANALYSIS: A state is able to exert ownership over a shipwreck and 
usurp the federal court of jurisdiction in two scenarios: (1) when the state 
acquires actual possession of the shipwreck; and (2) pursuant to the 
ASA, if the state intervenes in federal court and establishes the vessel is 
abandoned and embedded in the state’s submerged lands. Id. at 685. 
Concerned that disclosure of the shipwreck’s precise location would lead 
to the state taking actual possession of the shipwreck, thus barring 
federal jurisdiction, the salvor refused to disclose the shipwreck’s 
location. Id. at 689. Accordingly, the court was forced to balance the 
salvor’s interest in retaining federal jurisdiction and the state’s interest in 
obtaining adequate information to further its investigation whether the 
shipwreck was embedded in its lands. Id. at 690. The court recognized 
that federal courts are required “to give due weight to the important 
interests that states have in abandoned shipwrecks embedded in their 
territorial waters.” Id. Additionally, the court noted that federal courts 
must first issue an arrest warrant over the shipwreck, securing federal 
jurisdiction before the precise location is disclosed. Id. at 695–96. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that “although a federal court 
may require a salvor to reveal the precise location of a vessel after a state 
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has intervened to assert a claim under the ASA, the court must first 
ensure that the state cannot divest the court of federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 
696. 
 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT  
Bayo v. Chertoff, 535 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether due process requires that an alien’s waiver 
under the Visa Waiver Program (“VWP”) must be knowing and 
voluntary. Id. at 753. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that a waiver is “an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right, which means that it must be voluntary 
and knowing.” Id. at 755. A signature alone is not enough to waive 
federal rights. Id. Instead, there must be a “reason beyond the signature 
alone to believe that the waiver is knowing and voluntary.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that a waiver under the VWP is 
valid only if entered knowingly. Id. at 757–58. 
 
United States v. Rogers, 542 F.3d 197 (7th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the probation that follows a convict’s release 
from prison may be said to constitute confinement imposed for that 
conviction for the purpose of calculating the ten-year period in which a 
witness may be impeached for prior convictions pursuant to FED. R. 
EVID. 609(b). Id at 200–01. 
 ANALYSIS: In 2005, Anthony Rogers was tried on charges of 
making a false statement on a firearm purchase form and testified in his 
own defense. Id. at 198. The government then impeached Rogers with 
his 1993 conviction for distribution of cocaine. Subsequent to that 
conviction, Rogers was released from prison in 1994 and remained on 
probation until 1999. Id. The court noted that Rule 609(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence states that “[e]vidence of a conviction under this rule 
is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the 
date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the 
confinement imposed for that conviction whichever is later.” Id. at 200. 
The court analyzed the revised draft of the rule of 1971 which made no 
mention of the time limit running from the end of parole as well as the 
Fifth Circuit’s ruling that “confinement” for purposes of calculating the 
ten-year time limit in Rule 609(b) does not include parole supervision. 
Id. at 200. 
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CONCLUSION: The court held that “‘confinement’ for purposes of 
the ten-year time limit in Rule 609(b) does not include periods of 
probation or parole.” Id. at 201. 
 
Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) authorizes 
class action certification for claims seeking rescission. Id. at 571. 
ANALYSIS: The 7th Circuit first noted that TILA was intended 
protect borrowers from the deceptive practices of lenders by requiring 
the lender to make certain disclosures of the credit terms. Id. at 573. 
When a creditor has violated TILA, the court observed, the borrower is 
entitled to either money damages or rescission of the loan transaction. Id. 
The court reasoned that rescission is a “purely personal remedy” that is 
not appropriate in class action suits. Id. The logistics of rescission and 
the decision to seek rescission varies among plaintiffs, and therefore is 
“an extremely poor fit for the class-action mechanism.” Id. at 574. 
Further, the court noted that class action claims for damages are 
permitted, but are subject to a maximum. Id. The cap on damages, the 
court reasoned, implies that the rescission remedy of TILA is intended to 
be an “individualized” remedy that is inappropriate for class action 
claims. Id. at 575. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit joined the 1st and 5th Circuits in 
holding that class action claims for rescission of loan transactions are not 
permitted under TILA. Id. at 578. 
 
Evers v. Astrue, 536 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether a plaintiff’s due process and regulatory claims 
are claims “relating to” the contract under the Contract Disputes Act, 41 
U.S.C. § 601 and therefore preclude the plaintiff from raising the claims 
in federal district court. Id. at 657. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “other circuits have 
determined whether a claim ‘relates to the contract’ based upon the 
source of the plaintiff’s rights and the relief sought by the plaintiff.” Id. 
The court reasoned that if the source of the plaintiff’s rights and the 
remedies sought are “essentially contractual,” then the plaintiff is 
precluded from raising his claims in federal district court. Id. The court 
then cited to the 6th Circuit’s reasoning that the plaintiff’s 
“‘characterization of its claims is not controlling. [A] plaintiff may not 
avoid the jurisdictional bar of the [Contract Disputes Act] merely by 
alleging violations of regulatory or statutory provisions.’” Id. at 658. The 
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court then applied this framework and examined the source of the 
plaintiff’s claims and remedies sought. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded the plaintiff’s due process and 
regulatory claims and remedies sought were related to the contract, thus 
they could not be raised in federal district court. Id. at 660–61. Therefore, 
the 7th Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction. Id. 
 
Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether firing a female employee “for taking time off 
from work to undergo in vitro fertilization after being diagnosed with 
infertility” is discrimination on the basis of sex “under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act” (“Title VII”). Id. at 645. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the scope of Title VII claims 
includes “certain inherently gender-specific characteristics that may not 
form the basis for disparate treatment of employees,” specifically 
pregnancy, “childbirth and medical conditions related to pregnancy or 
childbirth.” Id. at 647. The court then analyzed a Supreme Court decision 
differentiating the permissible “gender-neutral characteristic of fertility 
alone” as opposed to “the gender-specific characteristic of childbearing 
capacity” held to be “invalid under [Title VII].” Id. at 648. Finally, the 
court recognized that “[e]mployees terminated for taking time off to 
undergo [in vitro fertilization]—just like those terminated for taking time 
off to give birth or receive other pregnancy-related care—will always be 
women” as the treatment “is one of several assisted reproductive 
technologies that involves a surgical impregnation procedure.” Id. at 
648–49. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that termination of a female 
employee for undergoing in vitro fertilization is not termination “for the 
gender-neutral condition of infertility, but rather for the gender-specific 
quality of childbearing capacity” and thus a valid discrimination claim 
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EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
Mitchell v. United States Parole Comm., 538 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the Parole Commission’s (“Commission”) 
failure to conduct a timely early-termination hearing renders a parolee’s 
custody unlawful. Id. at 951. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by looking at the text of 18 U.S.C.S. § 
4211(c)(1), which requires the Commission to conduct an early-
termination hearing after five years of a parolee’s release on parole. Id. at 
950. The court agreed with the other circuits which have held that the 
meaning of the statute cannot be resolved simply by conducting an 
analysis of the text of the statute. Id. at 951. However, the court reasoned 
that the legislative history of the statute strongly supports finding that the  
parolee has the ability to compel a prompt hearing if the hearing is not 
conducted in a timely manner. Id. There is nothing to indicate that the 
parolee should be released from custody as a result of an untimely 
hearing. Id. The question of release is then left to the Commission’s 
discretion based on the likelihood that the parolee has been rehabilitated. 
Id. Once the Commission has rendered a decision, the parolee does not 
have the option to argue that the Commission would have held 
differently if the hearing had been held in a timely manner. Id. at 952. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the Commission’s failure to 
conduct a timely early-termination hearing is a procedural error which 
does not warrant making the determination that the parolee’s custody is 
unlawful. Id at 951. Additionally, the court noted that the proper relief 
for the parolee is to compel a prompt hearing. Id at 952. 
 
United States v. Cole, 525 F.3d 656 (8th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the phrase “any firearm” in the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(4) applies only “to the 
firearms that the defendant was convicted of possessing” for purposes of 
sentence enhancement. Id. at 659. 
ANALYSIS: Although the 5th, 6th, and 11th Circuits have addressed 
the meaning of “any firearm,” the 8th Circuit looked to its previous 
decision in United States v. Mann for guidance regarding the meaning of 
the phrase “any firearm.” Id. Following the construction of the phrase in 
Mann, the court construed the term broadly in subsection (b)(4) because 
“[i]t is a principle of statutory interpretation that identical phrases in a 
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statute, particularly when they occur in close proximity, are ordinarily 
given an identical meaning.” Id. Thus, the court did not limit the phrase 
to only firearms defendants are convicted of possessing. Id. at 659–60. 
However, the court explained that Congress impliedly limited the phrase 
“any firearm that was stolen” in subsection (b)(4) because Congress did 
not mention any conduct required to violate subsection (b)(4) and “a 
stolen firearm obviously cannot itself be conduct.” Id. at 660. Since the 
guideline lacked “explicit instructions,” the court concluded that general 
relevant conduct provisions apply. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that sentence enhancement for 
possession of a stolen firearm applies whenever the firearm “is involved 
in the offense of conviction or in relevant conduct.” Id. 
 
United States v. Azure, 539 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether a district court’s failure to properly “designate 
a magistrate judge to conduct hearings to modify, revoke, or terminate 
supervised release” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3401(i) (2006) constitutes 
jurisdictional error. Id. at 907–08. 
ANALYSIS: The 8th Circuit reviewed precedent of both the 1st and 
5th Circuits and concluded that “the lack of a proper designation under 
section 3401(i) is not a jurisdictional error but a procedural error . . . 
because the district court retained subject matter jurisdiction, even as the 
magistrate judge conducted Azure’s revocation hearing.” Id. at 908. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the failure to designate the 
magistrate judge constitutes procedural rather than jurisdictional error. 
Id. Consequently, a defendant waives the right to raise this issue on 
appeal where the defendant fails to raise the issue prior to the district 
court’s judgment. Id. at 910. 
  
Milavetz v. United States, 541 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether attorneys fall within the definition of debt 
relief agencies under 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A). Id. at 790. 
ANALYSIS: Examining the definitions provided under 11 U.S.C.S. 
§ 110, the 8th Circuit reasoned that “[t]he plain reading of the definition 
of debt relief agency, and the defined terms that make up that definition, 
leads us to conclude that attorneys who provide ‘bankruptcy assistance’ 
to ‘assisted persons’ are unambiguously included in the definition of 
‘debt relief agencies.’” Id. at 791. The court further reasoned that 
“Congress specifically listed five exclusions from the definition of ‘debt 
relief agency,’ and if it meant to exclude attorneys from that definition it 
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could have explicitly done so.” Id. Finally, the 8th Circuit examined the 
legislative history behind 11 U.S.C. § 101 to find that attorneys are 
included in the definition. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The Eighth Circuit held “attorneys that provide 
bankruptcy assistance to ‘assisted persons’ are ‘debt relief agencies’ as 
that term is defined in the Code.” Id. at 792. 
 
In re Racing Servs., 540 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether “a creditors’ committee may proceed 
derivatively when the debtor-in-possession (or trustee) consents to its 
suit.” Id. at 901–02. 
ANALYSIS: The 8th Circuit followed the reasoning of the 2nd and 
9th Circuits and indicated that a trustee, or debtor-in-possession, is 
obligated “to pursue all actions that are in the best interests of creditors 
and the estate.” Id. The court stated that, in order to enable the debtor-in-
possession to discharge its obligation, the debtor-in-possession should be 
able “to coordinate litigation responsibilities with an unsecured [creditor 
or] creditors’ committee.” Id. Additionally, the court indicated that, in 
order to establish derivative standing where the debtor-in-possession 
consents to a creditor committee’s suit, the committee must show that the 
suit is “necessary and beneficial to the fair and efficient resolution of the 
bankruptcy proceedings.” Id at 902. However, the court noted that the 
creditor committee’s burden to establish derivative standing is higher 
where the debtor in possession consents to the action because “not every 
‘beneficial’ action is ‘necessary’ for a given proceeding.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “a creditor (or creditor’s 
committee) may obtain derivative standing to pursue avoidance actions 
under circumstances in which the trustee (or debtor-in-possession) either 
unjustifiably refuses to bring the creditor’s proposed claims or consents 
to the creditor pursuing such claims in his stead.” Id. at 904–05. The 
court further held that “the bankruptcy courts may retroactively grant a 
creditor derivative standing,” but “that under no circumstances may a 
creditor prosecute its derivative complaint without the bankruptcy court’s 
permission.” Id. at 905. 
 
 
148 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 5:99 
 
Duluth, Winnipeg & Pac. Ry. Co. v. City of Orr, 529 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 
2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the Federal Railway Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 
20101, preempted a state law regulating the speed of trains. Id. at 795. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “Congress passed the Federal 
Railway Safety Act (the Act) . . . to ‘promote safety in every area of rail 
operations,’” and that the Secretary of Transportation “prescribes 
comprehensive national track safety standards which address 
maintenance, repair, and inspection of tracks.” Id. at 796. Further noting 
that the Act generally preempts a state law that addresses the same 
subject matter, the court recognized that 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2) 
“nevertheless creates a narrow exception to preemption through its 
savings clause.” Id. The court recognized that under the savings clause, a 
state may “enact an otherwise preempted law” to address “railroad safety 
or security if it ‘(A) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially 
local safety or security hazard; (B) is not incompatible with a law, 
regulation, or order of the United States Government; and (C) does not 
unreasonably burden interstate commerce.’” Id. The court stated that the 
“purpose of the savings clause is to ‘enable the states to respond to local 
situations not capable of being adequately encompassed within the 
uniform national standards.’” Id. The court relied on the Act’s legislative 
history and how other circuits have defined “an essentially local safety 
hazard” to establish that “[i]f the local situation is actually statewide in 
character or capable of being adequately encompassed within national 
uniform standards, it will not be considered an essentially local safety 
hazard.” Id. at 798. The court stated that “not one of the five cited 
conditions is unique to Orr . . . [and] the evidence . . . does not support a 
conclusion that this combination of conditions could not exist in other 
places in the state or elsewhere in the country.” Id. at 799. Furthermore, 
the court noted that “[i]t is undisputed that each condition cited by Orr 
has been or could be adequately addressed within the national track 
safety standards.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that since “the special law does not 
meet the first of the three requirements to come within the § 20106 
savings clause . . . it is preempted” by the Act. Id. at 800. 
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NINTH CIRCUIT 
Jacobs v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether Nevada Revised Statute § 392.458 (“N.R.S. § 
392.458”), establishing “a policy that requires pupils to wear school 
uniforms,” violates the First Amendment’s Free Speech and Free 
Exercise Clauses, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, or 
amounts to compelled speech. Id. at 422–23. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit explained that the school uniform 
policies enacted under N.R.S. § 392.458 restricted only students’ 
content-neutral speech and expression and therefore need only withstand 
intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 428. The court held the school uniform 
policies to be “content-neutral, despite their allowances for clothing 
containing school logos” because the goals of such policies were “not to 
suppress the expression of particular ideas.” Id. at 432–33. The court 
found that the uniform policies withstood intermediate scrutiny because 
they furthered important governmental interests unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression and permitted “alternate channels for 
student communication.” Id. at 435–37. The Court noted that the uniform 
policies did not compel students to communicate “any message 
whatsoever,” and because the policy, if “applied to all students equally,” 
did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Id. at 
438–39. Additionally, the court also found that the Due Process Clause 
did not require school districts to adhere to their own regulations, and 
therefore any failure to seek parental approval for such uniform policies 
may only be a violation of state law. Id. at 441. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit concluded that the schools uniform 
policies implemented under N.R.S. § 392.458 do not violate students’ 
“free speech, free exercise, or due process rights.” Id. at 442. 
 
Clark v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the Social Security Act’s limit on attorneys’ 
fees, to 25% of past due benefits, applies only to those fees awarded 
under section 406(b), or to those awarded under both section 406(a) and 
section 406(b). Id. at 1214-15. 
ANALYSIS: In analyzing how the Social Security Act limits the 
award of attorney’s fees, the court reasoned that “[s]ection 406(a) grants 
the Social Security Administration exclusive jurisdiction to award 
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attorney’s fees for representation of a Social Security claimant in 
proceedings before the Administration.” “[S]ection 406(b) grants federal 
courts exclusive jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees for representation 
of the claimant in court.” Id. at 1215. In examining the legislative history 
of section 406(a), the court determined that “[w]hile amending § 406(a), 
Congress chose not to impose a categorical ceiling on the 
Administration’s authority to award attorney’s fees for representation 
before the Administration.” Id. In finding that section 406(b) limits 
awards only under its own section, the court reasoned that “if a fee award 
under § 406(a) can be greater than 25% of past-due benefits, it follows 
that the combined amount of fees awarded under both § 406(a) and § 
406(b) must be capable of exceeding 25% of past-due benefits.” Id. at 
1218. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “the plain text of 42 U.S.C. 
section 406(b) limits only the amount of attorney’s fees awarded under 
section 406(b), not the combined fees awarded under section 406(a) and 
section 406(b), to 25% of the claimant’s past-due benefits.” Id. 
 
Ordlock v. Comm’r. of Internal Revenue, 533 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 
2008) 
QUESTION: “Whether 26 U.S.C. § 6015 preempts community 
property law for purposes of calculating innocent spouse refunds.” Id. at 
1140. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit held that 26 U.S.C. § 6015 determines 
whether a taxpayer qualifies as an “innocent spouse” for tax purposes, 
but that this statute does not preempt state law regarding the 
determination of an innocent spouse’s eligibility for refunds. Id. The 
court reasoned that “if Congress had intended . . . § 6015(a) to preempt 
community property laws with respect to the issuance of a refund, it 
would have clarified that the decision to make such an issuance was a 
‘determination’ within the meaning of the statute.”  Id. at 1141. Although 
the statute says that “notwithstanding any other law or rule of law . . . 
credit or refund shall be allowed or made to the extent attributable to the 
application of this section,” the court, in keeping with its earlier 
decisions, held that this phrase was not to be read literally, but to be read 
in the context of Congress’s evident intent to avoid issues of res judicata.  
Id. at 1144. 
CONCLUSION: Drawing on the statute’s legislative history, the 9th 
Circuit held that 26 U.S.C. § 6015 merely determines whether a taxpayer 
is an innocent spouse for purposes of tax refunds. Id. at 1141. Despite 
apparent language to the contrary, it does not preempt community 
2008] First Impressions 151 
property law for the purposes of determining whether that taxpayer is 
eligible for innocent spouse refunds. Id. at 1143. 
 
Doissaint v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
can cure the legal error of construing a properly raised and briefed 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) claim as abandoned in subsequent 
consideration of a motion to reopen. Id. at 1170. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit stated that a motion to reopen is “purely 
fact-based, seeking to present newly discovered facts or circumstances 
since a petitioner’s hearing.” Id. The court further noted that “a motion to 
reconsider does not present new law or facts, but rather challenges 
determinations of law and fact made by the BIA. In contrast, a motion to 
reopen seeks to present new facts that would entitle the alien to relief 
from deportation.” Id. The court also stated that once the BIA realized its 
error, it should have reconsidered the previous decision and addressed 
the claim strictly on the merits. Id. at 1171. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “when the BIA commits 
legal error in a direct appeal, the BIA cannot cure that error in a denial of 
the motion to reopen.” Id. 
 
United States v. Mi Kyung Byun, 530 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether a conviction for importation of an alien, who 
is a minor, for the purposes of prostitution makes the convicted person a 
sex offender under Title I of the Walsh Act, which requires sex offenders 
to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. Id. 
at 1143. 
ANALYSIS: The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
(“SORNA”) requires that individuals who have been convicted of a “sex 
offense” under § 16911(5)(A) register, and keep the registration current. 
Id. at 1143. Importing an alien, who is also a minor, for the purposes of 
prostitution does not directly match a specified offense against a minor 
under § 16911(5)(A)(ii). Id. at 1144. The closest offense delineated is 
“solicitation to practice prostitution,” however, importing an alien for the 
purposes of prostitution does not necessarily mean that the person was 
“solicited, urged, advised, or otherwise incited” to engage in prostitution. 
Id. at 1145. The provision includes a catchall provision for an instance 
when the offense charged is not specifically tailored to one of the listed 
offenses that define a sex offense as any “conduct that by its nature is a 
sex offense against a minor.” Id. The court determined that importing an 
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alien with the intent to engage that minor in prostitution is sufficient to 
fulfill the requirements of the catchall provision. Id. at 1146. 
Additionally, the court noted that even if the underlying conviction does 
not specifically state that the person who was imported was a minor, the 
court is permitted to use a non-categorical approach to determine if the 
person was in fact a minor. Id. at 1148. The court determined that both 
the language of SORNA and the legislative intent require this approach. 
Id. Because the statutory language states “when committed against a 
minor,” rather than “convicted,” the appropriate judicial inquiry is a 
categorical approach to determine if the offense falls into the sentencing 
guidelines. Id. The court determined that it is the underlying conduct, 
rather than the elements of the crime convicted of, that should steer the 
sentencing for purposes of SORNA. Id. at 1149. Additionally, the 
legislative history points towards Congress’s desire to include “all 
individuals who commit sex crimes against minors, not only those who 
were convicted under a statute having the age of the victim as an 
element” within the purview of SORNA. Id. 
CONCLUSION: Conviction for importation of an alien for the 
purposes of prostitution is a “specified offense against a minor” which 
constitutes a sex offense and subsequently triggers the registration 
requirements under Title I of the Walsh Act. Id. at 1144. 
 
Farrar v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Haw., 284 Fed. 
Appx. 463 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the petitioners met the strict prerequisites for 
a writ of mandamus to challenge the district court’s denial of their 
motion alleging a due process violation based on an allegedly illegal 
seizure and detainment of their property without a timely filed civil 
forfeiture complaint, and requesting a return of their property and 
interest. Id. at 463–64.      
ANALYSIS: In order to determine whether relief through a writ of 
mandamus is appropriate, the Ninth Circuit considered whether: (1) the 
petitioner has other means of attaining the desired relief, such as a direct 
appeal; (2) the petitioner will be damaged in a way not correctable on 
appeal; (3) the district court’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter of 
law; (4) the order is an oft-repeated error or manifests a persistent 
disregard of the federal rules; and (5) the order raises new and important 
problems or legal issues of first impression. Id. at 464. The court held 
that a direct appeal would be available to correct the alleged error, in 
addition to the means currently available in the district court such as 
moving to dismiss the government’s complaint. Id. The court also held 
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that it did not have a firm conviction that the district court clearly erred 
as a matter of law. Id. Further, it was not apparent that the district court 
committed an oft-repeated error. Id. Lastly, although the case did present 
an issue of first impression, this one favorable factor was not enough for 
the petitioners to carry their heavy burden of proving their clear and 
indisputable right to mandamus relief. Id. at 464–65. 
CONCLUSION: Because the petitioners did not meet the strict 
prerequisites for a writ of mandamus, the Ninth Circuit denied their 
petition. Id. 
 
United States v. Fuller, 531 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether possession of falsified identification 
purportedly issued by a nonexistent government agency is prosecutable 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(6). Id. at 1024. 
ANALYSIS: The court first interpreted the statutory language to 
mean that “the statute requires that the document appear to be . . . issued 
under the authority of the United States; it does not require that the 
document actually be made . . . under the authority of the United States.” 
Id. at 1026. The court then noted that Congress intended to punish 
knowing possession of such documents, and excluding identification 
from a nonexistent agency would defeat that purpose. Id. at 1027. 
Further, the court found that even if the document is suspect on its face, 
whether it purports to be issued under the authority of the United States 
is a determination to be made by a jury. Id. at 1026. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a person who knowingly 
possesses false identification that appears to be issued under the authority 
of the United States may be convicted under § 1028(a)(6), even if the 
agency that purportedly issued the document does not exist. Id. at 1028. 
 
Arizona v. United States Dist. Court, 528 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “Whether a district court has the authority to require a 
defendant to prepare a Martinez report.” Id. at 655–56. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit noted that a Martinez report provides 
the district court with a factual basis and develops a record for the court 
to look to in determining preliminary decisions. Id. The court considered 
both the nature of the claims involved here and the timing of the district 
court’s order and found that in these circumstances the “burden of 
production was appropriately shifted to” the government to produce a 
“comprehensive, substitute record” to allow the court to determine 
whether the incarcerated petitioner’s claims against the government are 
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valid. Id. at 656, 659. The court further articulated that while in some 
cases such an order could be considered an abuse of discretion, here, the 
limitations that the district court placed on both the investigation and the 
report demonstrated that it had acted within its discretion in issuing the 
order for the preparation of the Martinez report. Id. at 659. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that it is within a district 
court’s discretion to require defendants to prepare a Martinez report 
where it “is reasonably tailored to the pretrial needs of the district court 
to assess the case.” Id. 
 
United States v. Santos, 527 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “Whether a district court may use the face value 
of stolen checks in estimating the intended loss of a counterfeit                            
scheme . . . .” Id. at 1007. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit adopted the approach of the 3rd and 
11th Circuits, holding that “[a]bsent evidence to the contrary, the district 
court may reasonably infer that the participants in a counterfeiting 
scheme intend to take as much as they know they can.” Id. at 1008. The 
9th Circuit reasoned that where there is a counterfeiting scheme 
involved, the court can consider the nature of the scheme and the 
circumstances surrounding it, for instance whether the materials and 
equipment to continue the scheme were still in the defendant’s 
possession at the time of arrest. Id. at 1009. In considering these 
circumstances, it is “reasonable for [a] district court to infer from this 
evidence that they would have continued to produce and cash counterfeit 
checks had they not been caught.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “absent countervailing 
evidence showing that the defendant intended to take less, a district court 
may reasonably infer, for the purposes of calculating intended loss under 
[U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL] § 2B1.1(b)(1), that a 
participant in a counterfeiting scheme intends to take up to the full face 
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Simpson v. Thomas, 528 F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 2008) 
Editor’s Note: This case resolves two issues of first impression 
concerning federal evidentiary findings. 
 
QUESTION ONE: “[W]hether Heck v. Humphrey[, 512 U.S. 477 
(1994)] may be used to bar evidence in a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 [(2006)] 
claim for excessive force.” Id. at 691. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by examining the 
difference between section 1983 and the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§2254 (2006), concluding that unlike the former, the latter requires state 
prisoners to exhaust state remedies. Id. at 693. The court then cited the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Heck to find that “‘when a state prisoner 
seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity 
of his conviction or sentence,’” and if it does not, “‘the action should be 
allowed to proceed in the absence of some other bar to the suit.’” Id. at 
693–94. Therefore, the court reasoned, Heck was only intended to 
restrain prisoners from undermining the provisions of § 2254 by filing 
suit under § 1983, not whether evidence should be admitted. Id. at 695. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that “Heck does not create a rule of 
evidence exclusion. Therefore, if . . . a party is permitted to proceed on a 
§ 1983 claim, relevant evidence may not be barred under the rule 
announced in Heck.” Id. at 690. 
 
QUESTION TWO: “[W]hether prior convictions more than ten years 
old may be used for impeachment purposes under FED. R. EVID. 609 if 
those prior convictions are used to enhance a sentence for a separate 
conviction that falls within the ten-year time limit of [FED. R. EVID.] 
609(b).” Id. at 689. 
ANALYSIS: Drawing from prior precedent, the 9th Circuit 
referenced its decision in cases challenging the Federal Three Strikes 
Provision. Id. In those cases, the court “declined to hold that such a 
provision violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, observing that the 
enhanced punishment imposed for the later offense is not [an] additional 
penalty for the earlier crimes, but instead . . . a stiffened penalty for the 
latest crime.” Id. at 689–90. The court then applied this analysis to 
California’s Three Strikes Provision and stated that if a defendant’s prior 
convictions older than ten years were applied, they would not represent 
“a stiffened penalty for the latest crime.” Id. at 690 (emphasis added).  
The court also considered the plain language of FED. R. EVID. 609(b), 
finding that it “exclude[s] evidence of a conviction if it has been more 
156 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 5:99 
than ten years ‘since the date of the conviction or the release of the 
witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction.’” Id. (quoting 
FED. R. EVID. 609(b)). 
CONCLUSION: The court held that prior convictions more than ten 
years old “do not endure for the purposes of [FED. R. EVID.] 609(b) and 
therefore are not admissible against the witness, unless the court 
determines “‘that the probative value of the conviction supported by 
specific facts and evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial 
effect.’” Id. at 689 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 609(b)). 
 
United States v. Reveles-Espinoza, 522 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the felony cultivation of marijuana under 
California Health and Safety Code § 11358 constitutes an aggravated 
felony within the meaning of federal law. Id. at 1047. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit provided that “in determining whether a 
state offense fits within the generic definition of aggravated felony, we 
first make a categorical comparison of the elements of that statute of 
conviction to the generic definition.” Id. The California law criminalizes 
“planting, cultivating, harvesting, drying, or processing any marijuana.” 
Id. The court stated that the offense under California law is essentially a 
drug-trafficking crime that would constitute aggravated felony under 8 
U.S.C. § 1229(b). Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that felony cultivation of marijuana 
under California law qualifies as an aggravated felony under federal law. 
Id. 
 
Phillips v. E.I Dupont de Nemours & Co. (In re Hanford Nuclear 
Reservation Litig.), 521 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: The Bellwether trial brought forth the issue of whether 
a defendant “may seek complete immunity under the common law 
government contractor defense, because they were operating Hanford 
[Nuclear Weapons Reservation] at the request of the federal 
government.” Id. at 1039. 
ANALYSIS: In determining whether a federal statute trumps a 
common law right, the court must determine whether a purpose contrary 
to a common law defense is evident. Id. at 1045. Using a two-step 
inquiry, the court upheld the District Court’s ruling that the Price-
Anderson Act (“PAA”) pre-empted the defendant’s common law 
government contractor defense because: (1) the statute predates any 
judicial recognition of the defense; and (2) “the statute’s comprehensive 
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liability scheme is patently inconsistent with the defense and precludes 
its operation in [the] case.” Id. The court found that the defense was 
inconsistent with Congressional intent. Id. at 1046. The court also upheld 
the District Court’s imposition of strict liability. Id. at 1047. It upheld the 
District Court’s instruction to the jury to substitute its own reasonable 
“emission standard,” since there were no government standards to apply. 
Id. The court also agreed with the District Court holding that Defendant’s 
conduct was a dangerous activity and that it did not qualify for a public 
duty exemption. Id. at 1049. Certain plaintiffs appealed that their medical 
monitoring claims should have been decided in state court. Id. The court 
upheld the District Court’s decision to retain jurisdiction and that 
medical monitoring claims were not compensable under the PAA. Id. at 
1054. The court also concluded “that members of the plaintiff-class who 
have filed individual suits are entitled to the benefits of American Pipe 
tolling.” Id. at 1053. As to the District Court rulings during the 
Bellwether trial, the court held: (1) that the district court properly 
instructed the jury on but-for causation; (2) that a new trial be ordered, 
since one of plaintiff’s experts was erroneously banned from testifying 
that he authored particular articles and that another expert should not 
have been cross-examined with deposition testimony of a non-testifying 
expert. Id. at 1054–57. The court found the latter to be prejudicial to 
Plaintiff. Id. at 1055. The court also ruled that excluding Hurthle Cell 
evidence was prejudicial. Id. at 1057. Finally, the Court affirmed on 
ancillary matters, including but not limited to: excluding certain witness 
testimony; voir dire and juror misconduct. Id. at 1058–61. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the immunity defense is 
“inapplicable as a matter of law, because Congress enacted the PAA 
before the courts recognized the government contractor defense, and “the 
PAA provides a comprehensive liability scheme that precludes 
Defendants’ reliance on such a defense.” Id. at 1039. The court held that 
under Washington law, “the district court properly instructed the jury 
that to impose liability, it had to find Hanford was the ‘but for’ cause of 
Plaintiffs’ diseases and not just a contributing cause under the more 
lenient ‘substantial factor’ test.” Id. at 1040. The court further held that 
among the evidentiary rulings before it, three constituted reversible error 
with respect to three Bellwether Plaintiffs. Id. 
 
Sanchez v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether subsequent to Moran v. Ashcroft, “the family 
unity waiver [contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(iii)] is available to 
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an alien denied cancellation because he smuggled his spouse, parent, or 
child into this country.” Id. at 1106. 
ANALYSIS: In Moran, the court “concluded that an applicant for 
cancellation of removal is eligible to be considered for a discretionary 
‘family unity’ waiver of the alien-smuggling bar when the smuggled 
alien was the applicant’s spouse, parent, son or daughter.” Id. The court 
denied the petitioner relief in that case, “because when the petitioner 
smuggled the alien, she was not yet his wife.” Id. The court reasoned 
that, “the waiver would have applied if they had been married at the time 
of the entry.” Id. at 1106–07. In the present case, the court applied its 
reasoning in Moran, opining that “under Moran, all of the provisions of § 
1182(a)(6)(E) pertaining to admissibility, including the family unity 
waiver, must be read into the provisions governing eligibility for 
cancellation. The government’s position cannot be squared with the 
reasoning of Moran.” Id. at 1109. The court disagreed with the 
government’s contention that the reasoning in Moran was “dictum” 
holding that the law in their circuit “when a panel selects a single line of 
reasoning to support its result, the reasoning cannot be ignored as 
dictum.” Id. at 1110. 
CONCLUSION: The court granted petitioner’s request for remand, 
commenting that “Congress knows how to create exceptions to the 
smuggling bar for the benefit of family reunification, and has done so. 
Here, Congress has clearly limited the application of the waiver. If 
Congress decides that a person who has smuggled immediate family 
members does not lack the good moral character required for 
cancellation of removal, it can so legislate. We cannot.” Id. at 1114. 
 
Ordlock v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 533 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 
2008) 
QUESTION: “Whether [the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.] § 
6015 preempts community property law for purposes of calculating 
innocent spouse refunds.” Id. at 1140. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit held that § 6015 determines whether a 
taxpayer qualifies as an “innocent spouse” for tax purposes, but that this 
statute does not preempt state law regarding the determination of an 
innocent spouse’s eligibility for refunds. Id. The court reasoned that “if 
Congress had intended . . . § 6015(a) to preempt community property 
laws with respect to the issuance of a refund, it would have clarified that 
the decision to make such an issuance was a ‘determination’ within the 
meaning of the statute.” Id. at 1141. 
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CONCLUSION: Drawing on the statute’s legislative history, the 9th 
Circuit held that § 6015 merely determines whether a taxpayer is an 
innocent spouse for purposes of tax refunds. Id. at 1141. Despite 
apparent language to the contrary, it does not preempt community 
property law for the purposes of determining whether that taxpayer is 
eligible for innocent spouse refunds. Id. at 1143. 
 
United States v. Becerril-Lopez, 541 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether a violation of California Penal Code § 211 
constitutes a “violent crime” within the meaning of § 2L1.2 of the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 889. 
ANALYSIS: In order to address the issue at hand, the 9th Circuit 
utilized the categorical approach established in Taylor v. United States. 
Id. at 890. In order “to demonstrate that § 211 is not per se an offense 
within the Guideline” the court emphasized that one must show “‘a 
realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would 
apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of 
[the] crime[s]’ listed in the enhancement guideline and also outside the 
enhancement’s ‘catch-all’ language.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “if a conviction under Cal. 
Penal Code § 211 involved a threat not encompassed by generic robbery, 
it would necessarily constitute generic extortion and therefore be a 
‘crime of violence’ under” § 2L1.2 of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines. Id. at 892. 
 
Steven N.S. Cheung, Inc. v. United States, 545 F.3d 695 (9th Cir. 
2008) 
QUESTION: “Whether the flush language of 26 U.S.C. § 
6621(a)(1),” which applies a rate reduction to the extent that an 
overpayment exceeds $10,000, “applies in the case of a wrongful levy 
judgment.” Id. at 695–98. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit found that Congress intended 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6621 to treat wrongful levy judgments as though they were 
overpayments “regardless of their true nature.” Id. at 699. Section 
7426(g) provides that the interest rate on wrongful levies shall be paid 
“at the overpayment rate described in § 6621.” Id. at 700. The court held 
that by “subjecting wrongful levy judgments to the overpayment rate as 
described in § 6621, Congress expressed its intent to give effect to the 
whole of § 6621(a)(1) in calculating the overpayment rate, including the 
rate reduction articulated” therein. Id. The court noted that 30 U.S.C. § 
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1721, which applies § 6621 to overpayments in oil and gas leases, 
specifically states that the rate reduction of § 6621 shall not apply to 
those situations. Id. The court reasoned that had Congress intended a 
similar exemption for wrongful levies, it would have included similar 
language in § 7426(g). Id. at 701. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “[t]he flush language of 26 
U.S.C. § 6621,” should be used to determine the interest rate in cases of 
wrongful levy judgments. Id. at 696. 
 
Carmona v. Carmona, 544 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether a “plan participant’s retirement cuts off a 
putative alternate payee’s right to obtain an enforceable [Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order (“DRO”)] with regard to the surviving spouse 
benefits of a [Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity].” Id. at 1000. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[a]llowing participants to change 
surviving spouse beneficiaries after the participant has retired and 
already begun receiving benefit payments would make it difficult for 
trustees to administer plans based on the actuarial value of both the 
participant and the surviving spouse.” Id. at 1004. The court therefore 
adopted the position of “other courts that have either implicitly or 
explicitly concluded that the surviving spouse benefits irrevocably vest 
in the current spouse when the plan participant retires.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held “only that a state DRO may not 
create an enforceable interest in surviving spouse benefits to an alternate 
payee after a participant’s retirement, because ordinarily at retirement the 
surviving spouse’s interest irrevocably vests.” Id. 
 
McClung v. City of Sumter, 545 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether “a legislative, generally applicable 
development condition that does not require the owner to relinquish 
rights in the real property, as opposed to an adjudicative land-use 
exaction, should be reviewed pursuant to the ad hoc standards of Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, or the nexus and 
proportionality standards of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 
and Dolan v. City of Tigard.” Id. at 805. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that the City’s requirement that new 
developments include at least 12-inch storm pipes is subject to the Penn 
Central test because the City Ordinance 1603 is “akin to the classic 
example recognized by Penn Central of zoning laws that generally do 
not affect existing uses of real property but rather affect proposed 
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development, and are upheld where the health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses 
of land.” Id. at 810. In addition, the court explained that unlike Nollan 
and Dolan, this case does not involve an adjudicative determination, and 
the McClungs are not required to relinquish rights in their real property. 
Id. The court found that the McClungs impliedly contracted to install the 
24-inch pipe because the McClungs received a letter from the City that 
gave the McClungs a choice of “either agreeing to install a 12-inch pipe 
and pay the usual fees, or install a 24-inch pipe.” Id. at 813. The court 
noted that the letter’s language indicated that the 24-inch pipe was not a 
mandatory requirement, and the McClungs installation of the 24-inch 
pipe was an acceptance of the letter’s offer. Id. “Because the McClungs 
were not compelled to install a 24-inch pipe, but voluntarily contracted 
with the City to do so, there was simply no ‘taking’ by the City.” Id.  
CONCLUSION: A legislative, generally applicable development 
condition that does not require the owner to relinquish rights in the real 
property should be reviewed pursuant to the ad hoc standards of Penn 
Central. Id. at 805. Holding that the Penn Central standard applied “to 
the City’s requirement that the McClungs install a storm pipe at least 12 
inches in diameter,” the court concluded “that the McClungs impliedly 
contracted to install a 24-inch pipe.” Id. at 813. Therefore, the City’s 
request “that the McClungs install a 24-inch pipe in exchange for the 
City approving their permit application and waiving certain permit and 
facilities fees” did not effect an illegal taking of their property by the 
City. Id. at 805. 
 
United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether telephone calls within a single state—
intrastate rather than interstate calls—can violate the Travel Act [18 
U.S.C. § 1952].” Id. at 715–16. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit recognized “that this is a question of 
congressional intent . . . .” Id. at 717. First, the court “consider[ed] the 
plain meaning of the statute’s text.” Id. According to the Travel Act, 
“‘[w]hoever . . . uses the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign 
commerce’ with the intent to carry on unlawful activity is guilty of a 
crime.” Id. The court concluded that “[t]he plain language of the statute 
is unambiguous.” Id. at 718. More specifically, “[t]he facility itself, not 
its use, must be in interstate commerce.” Id. 
The 9th Circuit acknowledged that other courts “have recognized a 
distinction between the phrases ‘in interstate commerce’ and ‘of 
interstate commerce.’” Id. at 718. However, the court resolved that it 
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would “attach no special significance to the use of the preposition ‘in’ 
rather than ‘of’ in the Travel Act.” Id. at 719. To support its argument, 
the 9th Circuit analogized the Travel Act to the closely-related murder-
for-hire statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1958. Id. at 719–20. The court opined that 
“[t]he murder-for-hire statute supports the conclusion that Congress did 
not intend to require actual interstate activity by using the phrase ‘in 
interstate or foreign commerce’ in the Travel Act,” and “[t]hat Congress 
intended the two phrases to be interchangeable [because] the murder-for-
hire statute supports the view that its use of one [phrase] rather than the 
other in the Travel Act has no special significance.” Id. Thus, “intrastate 
telephone calls involve the use of a facility ‘in’ interstate commerce.” Id. 
at 720. Noting that the Travel Act is worded broadly, the court concluded 
that “[i]ts plain text prevent[ed] [the court] from reading it to encompass 
only cases that involve organized crime or interstate criminal 
enterprises[,]” and thus a narrow reading of Congress’s legislative intent 
was without merit and should be outweighed by the textual interpretation 
of the Travel Act itself and its analogy to the murder-for-hire statute. Id. 
at 720–21. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit determined “that intrastate 
telephone calls made with the intent to further unlawful activity can 
violate the Travel Act [18 U.S.C. § 1952] because the telephone is a 
facility in interstate commerce.” Id. 
 
United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether an interrogation was custodial in nature under 
Miranda when the interrogation occurred in a closet of the suspect’s 
home while other law enforcement officers from three different agencies 
were searching his house pursuant to a valid search warrant. Id. at 1077. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit stated that the relevant inquiry is one 
which considers the “totality of circumstances,” to “decide whether a 
reasonable person in [the suspect’s] position would have felt deprived of 
his freedom of action in any significant way, such that he would not have 
felt free to terminate the interrogation.” Id. at 1082. Although a suspect is 
generally less likely to feel deprived of his freedom to act in his own 
home, the court held that the analysis turns on whether the interrogation 
environment was familiar and comfortable to the suspect or a “police-
dominated atmosphere.” Id. at 1083. The court considered four factors to 
determine if the interrogation took place in a police-dominated 
atmosphere: “(1) the number of law enforcement personnel and whether 
the were armed; (2) whether the suspect was at any point restrained, 
either by physical force or by threats; (3) whether the suspect was 
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isolated from others; and (4) whether the suspect was informed that he 
was free to leave or to terminate the interview, and the context in which 
any such statements were made.” Id. at 1084. 
First, the court reasoned that the presence of eight officers from 
three agencies, all of whom were wearing “raid vests,” and some of 
whom had unholstered their weapons created a law enforcement 
dominated environment. Id. at 1085. Second, the court found that 
although the suspect was not physically restrained, the fact that he was 
escorted to a closet with a detective blocking the door could lead a 
reasonable person to believe that he was not free to leave or terminate the 
interview. Id. at 1085–86. Third, the court concluded that the suspect was 
in fact isolated from the outside world, which is a hallmark of a coercive 
custodial interrogation. Id. at 1086–87. And fourth, the FBI agent 
informed the suspect that he was free to leave before being brought to the 
closet, but it was unclear if that fact was reiterated once he was brought 
to the closet, where he was sealed off from everyone else. Id. at 1087–89. 
In addition to these four factors, the court emphasized the concern that—
even if the suspect had felt free to leave—his home was overrun by law 
enforcement, effectively depriving the suspect of any freedom of action. 
Id. at 1083–88. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that in considering the totality 
of the circumstances, the in-home interrogation was custodial in nature, 
and therefore Miranda warnings were required. Id. at 1089. Despite the 
fact that the FBI agent informed the suspect that he was free to leave 
before bringing him to the closet, the circumstances were such that a 
reasonable person would have felt deprived of his freedom of action or 
unable to terminate the interrogation. Id. 
 
Western Filter Corp. v. Argan, Inc., 540 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a provision within a Stock Purchase 
Agreement (“SPA”) permitting the representations and warranties of the 
parties to survive closing, also serves as a contractual statute of limitation 
that reduces a longer period otherwise provided by [state] law.” Id. at 
949. 
ANALYSIS: The parties in this case disputed whether the plaintiff’s 
claims “were barred by the one-year limitation set forth in the Survival 
Clause [of the Stock Purchase Agreement].” Id. at 950. Plaintiff argued 
that the one-year limitation contained in the Survival Clause “serves only 
to set forth the time period for which a breach may occur or be 
discovered.” Id. at 951. The defendant argued that “the Survival Clause 
serves as a contractual limitation on the applicable statute of limitation.” 
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Id. The court agreed with plaintiff and held that “the one year limitation 
[in the Survival Clause] serves only to specify when a breach of the 
representations and warranties may occur, but not when an action must 
be filed.” Id. at 954. The court found that a party may “sue for breach of 
representations and warranties based on facts discovered pre-closing and 
up to one year after closing” and may bring its action for such breach 
“anytime so long as it is within the applicable California statute of 
limitation.” Id. at n.8.  The court justified its finding as reasonable “in 
light of California’s policy of strictly construing any contractual 
limitation against the party seeking to invoke the time limitation.”  Id. at 
954. 
CONCLUSION: A one-year limitation permitting the representations 
and warranties of the parties to survive closing “serves only to specify 
when a breach . . . may occur, but not when an action must be filed.” Id. 
 
Rodriguez v. Smith, 541 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) exercise of 
discretion pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §§ 570.20 and 570.21 in refusing inmate 
placement and transfer at a correctional facility violates Congressional 
intent that the BOP first consider the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 
3621(b). Id. at 1181–82. 
ANALYSIS: The court observed that other circuits have already 
addressed the issue at hand. Id. at 1182. The court noted that the 2nd, 
3rd, 8th and 10th Circuits have found that Congressional intent is clear 
from the text of § 3621(b) and, as such, the BOP regulations limiting an 
inmate’s placement and transfer to a correctional facility directly 
contradict the statute. Id. at 1183. The court further noted that only the 
1st Circuit has found that the BOP regulations are a valid exercise of 
discretion. Id. The court then utilized the framework set forth in Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. to decide whether 
Congressional intent was clear, for if so, “that is the end of the matter; 
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. 
The court turned to the “plain language” of the statute and 
concluded that while § 3624(c) places an “affirmative duty” on the BOP 
to consider placement at a correctional facility near the end of an 
inmate’s prison sentence, it does not prevent the BOP from considering 
such placement prior to the end of an inmate’s prison sentence. Id. at 
1184–85. Indeed, the court noted that § 3621(b) specifically provides that 
the BOP has discretion to place or transfer an inmate to a correctional 
facility. Id. at 1185. The court stated that the BOP regulations conflict 
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with the provisions set forth in § 3621(b). Id. at 1187. The court agreed 
with the 3rd Circuit, finding an “‘unavoidable conflict’” inherent in the 
BOP regulations because “the statute requires the BOP to consider five 
factors in determining . . . placement, while the regulation provides that 
the enumerated factors will not be fully considered.” Id. In failing to 
consider the “mandatory” factors of § 3621(b), the court stated that the 
BOP regulations violate clear Congressional intent and deemed them 
invalid. Id. at 1187–88. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the BOP regulations conflicted 
with § 3621(b). Id. at 1189. 
 
McDonald v. Checks-N-Advance, Inc. (In re Ferell), 539 F.3d 1186 
(9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether statutory damages are available for violations 
of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1638(b)(1) and 1632(a). Id. at 
1188. 
ANALYSIS: The court addressed the scope of the exceptions to 
recovery of statutory damages under the Truth in Lending Act 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1640(a). Id. at 1190. In connection with violations under § 1638, the 
court found that “the use of the word ‘only’ then limits recovery for 
violations of any of these disclosures to a closed list of violations” of § 
1638, which prohibited recovery of statutory damages in this case. Id. at 
1191. The court also reasoned that a violation of § 1632 “cannot form the 
basis for statutory damages, as it does not fall within the closed list of § 
1638(a) subsections, violations of which can support an award of 
statutory damages.” Id. at 1192. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy appellate 
court decision, which was “based on a close analysis of the text and 
legislative history of the Truth in Lending Act, and rejected the Trustee’s 
request for statutory damages.” Id. at 1189. 
 
United States v. Lam Thanh Pham, 545 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2008) 
Editor’s Note: This case resolves two issues of first impression 
concerning sentence enhancements under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines. 
 
QUESTION ONE: Whether including in the financial losses 
absorbed by banks upon bank fraud those losses suffered by the banks’ 
account holders constitutes impermissible double counting of victims for 
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the purposes of determining the appropriate sentencing enhancement. Id. 
at 717. 
  ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit stated that impermissible double 
counting occurs when one part of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (“Guidelines”) “is applied to increase a defendant’s 
punishment on account of . . . harm that has already been fully accounted 
for by application of another part of the Guidelines.” Id. Although the 
harm to the account holders had already been accounted for via banks, 
the court applied its holding from United States v. Thornton, in which it 
held that double counting is permissible “when it is necessary to make 
the defendant’s sentence reflect the full extent of the wrongfulness of his 
conduct.” Id. 
  CONCLUSION: “If the account holders and the banks suffered 
distinct wrongs as a result of [the fraud] and if accounting for those 
distinct wrongs is necessary to make the defendant’s sentence reflect the 
full extent of the wrongfulness of his conduct, then . . . it is not 
impermissible double counting to consider both groups as victims even if 
their losses are ultimately traceable to the same fraudulently obtained 
funds.” Id. 
 
  QUESTION TWO: Whether the expenses incurred by account 
holders in attempting to resolve the shortfalls in their accounts after bank 
fraud can be considered “actual loss” under the Guidelines, thus 
classifying the account holders as victims for purposes of sentencing 
enhancement. Id. at 721. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit stated that the expenses incurred by the 
account holders satisfy the Guidelines’ definition of “actual loss” 
because they are monetary or readily measurable in money. Id. 
Additionally, the court noted that “[t]he costs associated with resolving 
disputed account activity, canceling credit cards and initiating fraud 
investigations with credit reporting agencies a . . . reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of identity theft,” which can be an integral component of 
bank fraud. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the costs incurred by account 
holders in the course of resolving fraud damage to their accounts may be 
included in the calculation of “actual loss,” and therefore those who 
incurred the costs may qualify as victims under the Guidelines. Id. 
 
EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., 543 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the [Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”)] retains the authority to issue an administrative 
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subpoena against an employer after a charging party has been issued a 
right-to-sue notice and instituted a private action.”  Id. at 534. 
 ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit, noting that the scope of judicial 
inquiry in an agency subpoena enforcement proceeding is fairly narrow, 
first considered whether Congress had granted the EEOC the authority to 
investigate an employer charged with racial discrimination. Id. at 538. 
After determining that the EEOC was required to investigate the charge 
and could subsequently issue a right-to-sue notice to the charging party, 
the court stated that because the charge under investigation involved a 
possible pattern of discrimination affecting more than just the charging 
party, it constituted a circumstance in which continued inquiry was 
permissible. Id. at 539–40. 
CONCLUSION: While the “EEOC normally terminates the 
processing of the charge when it issues the right-to-sue notice, it can, 
under limited circumstances, continue to investigate the allegations in the 
charge, which includes the authority to subpoena information relevant to 
that charge.” Id. at 540. 
 
Ortiz-Magana v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether an alien is . . . an ‘aggravated felon’ when 
he is convicted under [California Penal Code] section 245(a)(1) as an 
aider and abettor instead of as a principal.” Id. at 654. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit initially recognized that “[a]ssault with 
a deadly weapon under California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) is a crime of 
violence as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16; therefore, an alien convicted of 
that offense generally is an ‘aggravated felon’ for immigration 
purposes.” Id. Relying on the Supreme Court’s analysis in Gonzales v. 
Duenas-Alvarez, the 9th Circuit opined that generally, “those who aid 
and abet a felony are treated the same as if they had personally 
committed the offense.” Id. at 658 (emphasis added). The court also 
recognized “that a conviction under section 245(a)(1) is a crime of 
violence, California convicts aiders and abettors under the same statute, 
and there is no material distinction between an aider and abettor and 
principals in any jurisdiction of the United States . . . [thus,] aiding and 
abetting an assault with a deadly weapon is the functional equivalent of 
personally committing that offense.” Id. As a result, such a violent crime 
“constitutes an aggravated felony.” Id. at 659. 
The 9th Circuit also analyzed the type of offense that constitutes a 
crime of violence as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16. Id. at 660. The court 
recognized that “nothing in the statutory definition [of 18 U.S.C. § 16] 
requires the offense to be personally committed by the individual.” Id. 
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Therefore, the court determined “that the statutory language [of 18 
U.S.C. § 16] encompasses crimes of violence that an alien aids and 
abets.” Id. at 661. The 9th Circuit also recognized that Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) determined that a defendant could be 
removed as an aggravated felon because regardless of whether he was 
convicted of a crime as an aider and abettor or a principal, the defendant 
was still convicted of a crime of violence. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “[a]n alien . . . who is 
convicted of aiding and abetting an assault with a deadly weapon under 
California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) has committed a crime of violence as 
if he had personally committed the offense[,]” and is thus removable for 
immigration purposes. Id.  
 
AFI Holding, Inc. v. Brown (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 530 F.3d 832 
(9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether a circuit court has jurisdiction over an order 
of removal of a bankruptcy trustee due to a conflict of interest pursuant 
to 11 U.S.C. § 324. Id. at 836–37. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) “vests 
jurisdiction in the Courts of Appeals over appeals only from all ‘final 
decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees entered’ either by the district 
courts or the B[ankruptcy] A[ppellate] P[anel].” Id. at 836. The court 
noted that the 11th Circuit recently held that the “‘removal of a 
bankruptcy trustee is a ‘final’ order appealable to this Court.’” Id. The 
court also noted the 3rd Circuit’s conclusion that a “district court’s order 
removing the trustee due to a conflict of interest was final.” Id. The court 
stated that “the B[ankruptcy] A[ppellate] P[anel] thoroughly and 
carefully considered what constitutes cause for removal under § 324 in 
its well-reasoned opinion.” Id. at 837–38. The court then noted the 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s determination that the “bankruptcy court 
did not abuse its discretion in concluding removal was proper due to the 
Trustee’s past affiliations with insiders that created a potential for a 
materially adverse effect . . . and an appearance of impropriety.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that it had jurisdiction to review the 
order of removal and that the removal of the trustee was proper. Id. 
 
Husyev v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether a circuit court has jurisdiction pursuant to the 
REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), to review final orders of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Id. at 1178. 
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ANALYSIS: The court noted that the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), 
generally requires “an asylum application to be filed ‘within 1 year after 
the date of the alien’s arrival in the United States.’” Id. at 1177–78. The 
court noted, however, an exception that allows an application to be 
considered if the applicant “‘demonstrates to the satisfaction of the 
Attorney General . . . extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in 
filing the application’” within the specified one year. Id. at 1178. In 
examining the jurisdictional issue, the court noted that there are “two 
potential obstacles.” Id. 
First, the court recognized that 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) specifies that 
“‘[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination of the 
Attorney General’ regarding the one-year bar or its exceptions for 
changed or extraordinary circumstances.” Id. The court noted, however, 
that under the REAL ID Act, “‘[n]othing in . . . any . . . provision of this 
chapter . . . which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed 
as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law.’” Id. 
The court therefore concluded that the “jurisdictional prohibition of § 
1158(a)(3) is accordingly overridden by the REAL ID Act for questions 
of law and constitutional claims.” Id. The court further held that 
determination of “extraordinary circumstances” presented a question of 
law “not subject to the jurisdictional restriction of § 1158(a)(3) on review 
of timeliness rulings in asylum cases.” Id. at 1179. 
Second, the court recognized the “restriction on jurisdiction to 
review discretionary determinations” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(B). Id. The court noted, however, that the REAL ID Act 
serves as an exception to the prohibition and specifically preserves a 
court’s jurisdiction “to review constitutional claims or questions of law.” 
Id. The court further noted that “‘[t]he plain language of the REAL ID 
Act grants jurisdiction to appellate courts to review questions of law 
presented in petitions for review of final orders . . . even those pertaining 
to otherwise discretionary determinations.’” Id. Thus, the court 
concluded that section 1252(a)(2)(B) did not prevent jurisdiction over 
“extraordinary circumstances” determinations. Id. at 1181. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that a circuit court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to the REAL ID Act to review the BIA’s final orders. Id. at 
1181. 
 
170 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 5:99 
 
Wolkowitz v. FDIC (In re Imperial Credit Indus.), 527 F.3d 959 (9th 
Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether when a debtor converts from Chapter 11 
bankruptcy to Chapter 7, the FDIC should be accorded administrative 
priority under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) or ninth priority under 11 U.S.C. § 
365(o). Id. 
ANALYSIS: Section 365(o) was enacted to prevent parties affiliated 
with federal depository institutions from “using bankruptcy to evade 
commitments to maintain capital reserve requirements of a federally 
insured depository institution.” Id. at 973. The court analyzed pertinent 
provisions of § 11 and determined that “the plain language of § 365(o) 
and § 507(a)(9) suggests that the FDIC’s claim under the performance 
guaranty—the result of a subsequent breach of an obligation under a 
capital maintenance commitment—is entitled to ninth priority.” Id. at 
974. The court rejected the district court’s holding that the FDIC’s claim 
was entitled to administrative priority under § 507(a)(2), which allows 
second priority to “administrative expenses.” Id. The court explained that 
“to the extent there is any ambiguity in the meaning of §§ 507(a)(9) and 
507(a)(2), § 507(a)(9)’s specific reference to debtors’ commitments to 
federal depository institutions ‘to maintain the capital of an insured 
depository institution’ should govern over § 507(a)(2)’s more general 
provision which arguably could cover the same subject matter.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that a failure to cure a § 365(o) 
deficit in a Chapter 11 case does not give rise to an administrative 
priority in a Chapter 7 case. Id. at 976. As such, the FDIC’s claim was 
entitled only to ninth priority under §§ 365(o) and 507(a)(9). Id. 
 
United States v. Mara, 523 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether unrelated criminal conduct following a 
guilty plea may be considered in evaluating a defendant’s acceptance of 
responsibility.” Id. at 1037–38. 
ANALYSIS: In exchange for a reduced sentence pursuant to the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”), Mara pled guilty to 
illegal possession of a firearm. Id. at 1037. However, prior to sentencing, 
Mara was involved in a physical altercation unrelated to his criminal 
conduct, and the government withdrew its reduced sentencing 
recommendation. Id. at 1038. Section 3E1.1(a) of the Guidelines states 
that a defendant’s offense may be reduced by two levels if there is a clear 
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demonstration of “acceptance of responsibility for his defense.” Id. The 
court began its analysis by noting that neither the Guideline’s text nor 
Application Notes “restrict consideration of criminal conduct to ‘related’ 
criminal conduct or even to conduct of the same nature as the offense.” 
Id. Furthermore, the court recognized that “[t]he sentencing judge is 
given significant latitude under the Guidelines to access the sincerity of a 
defendant’s claim of responsibility.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “Consideration of unrelated conduct is not improper 
because ‘the defendant’s post-offense conduct can shed significant light 
on the genuineness of a defendant’s claim remorse.’” Id. 
 
TENTH CIRCUIT  
Cuba Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. Lewis, 527 F.3d 1061 (10th 
Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the Federal Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 
(“FMLA”), 30 U.S.C. §§ 181–287, “provides political subdivisions of a 
State an implied cause of action to challenge the State’s allocation of 
federal mineral royalties received pursuant to the FMLA.” Id. at 1062. 
ANALYSIS: The court looked to Congress’s intent in enacting §191 
of the FMLA to determine whether the statutory scheme provided 
political subdivisions a means to enforce it through litigation. Id. at 
1063–64. The court determined that there was no clear indication that 
Congress intended to confer a cause of action to the plaintiffs, and for the 
court to do so would pose an “unwarranted intrusion upon State 
sovereignty.” Id. at 1064. The 10th Circuit ruled that the Congressional 
enactment of § 195 to remedy FMLA violations indicates that Congress 
did not intend to create a cause of action to challenge the allocation of 
federal royalties. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that nothing in the FMLA was 
intended to create an implied cause of action for the Plaintiffs, and 
therefore, relief was only available through the political process rather 
than the courts. Id. at 1065. 
 
Affordable Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Sandoval (In re Sandoval), 541 F.3d 997 
(10th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether “11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) render[s] 
nondischargeable a debt incurred by a debtor who has guaranteed a bail 
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bondsman to make the bondsman whole in the event a criminal 
defendant jumps bail.” Id. at 998. 
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit first examined whether defendant 
Sandoval’s debt was immune from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 
523(a)(7) by determining whether the debt met all three requirements 
specified in § 523(a)(7). Id. at 1001. Agreeing with the bankruptcy court, 
the 10th Circuit concluded that “‘Sandoval was not a party to the Bonds 
that were forfeited, and therefore his debt is not for a forfeiture of a bond, 
nor is his debt for a fine or penalty imposed upon him by the State.’” Id. 
The court held that “[e]xceptions to discharge are to be narrowly 
construed, and because of the fresh start objectives of bankruptcy, doubt 
is to be resolved in the debtor’s favor.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court 
ruling that a treatment of the debt as nondischargeable under §523(a)(7) 
would be inconsistent with the plain language of the section. Id. 
 
Kelley v. City of Albuquerque, 542 F.3d 802 (10th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a defense attorney representing an alleged 
violator of discrimination laws during an EEOC mediation qualifies as a 
protected participant under the ‘participation clause’ of [42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-3(a)].” Id. at 813. 
ANALYSIS: The court turned to the plain language of section 
2000e-3(a) to determine whether Title VII protected Plaintiff-Appellee 
from retaliation. Id. The court noted that the statute unambiguously 
provides protection to “‘any . . . employee’” participating “‘in any 
manner in . . . a proceeding.’” Id. (quoting § 2000e-3(a)). The court 
reasoned that the term “any” is expansive when “used without 
limitation,” and therefore “given its natural effect in this statutory 
context[,] relates to all types of participation” in proceedings under Title 
VII. Id. at 814 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that “the plain language of 
[section] 2000e-3(a) provides anti-retaliation protection for a defense 
attorney who represents an alleged violator of discrimination laws in an 
EEOC mediation.” Id. at 813. 
 
United States v. Davis, 286 Fed. Appx. 574 (10th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether “the post- 9/11 security environment” affects 
the “voluntariness of police encounters and baggage searches in 
airports.” Id. at 578. 
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ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that the defendant’s “‘post-9/11’ 
argument [regarding the airport and the officers’ actions] is in essence 
one of coercion, . . . [and] was so inherently coercive that he could not 
have voluntarily consented to the encounter and the search [of his bag].” 
Id. at 579. The court noted that “‘[a] consensual encounter is not a 
seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.’” Id. In determining 
“‘whether an encounter is consensual,’” the 10th Circuit considered a 
number of factors, including the place of the encounter, the behavior of 
the officers, length of time the defendant’s belongings were held, and 
whether the officers informed the defendant of his rights. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that none of these factors were 
present in the encounter and search of the defendant’s bag, therefore the 
encounter was not inherently coercive and the “post-9/11 security 
environment” did not affect the voluntariness of this airport encounter. 
Id. 
 
Scrivener v. Mashburn (In re Scrivener), 535 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 
2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the bankruptcy court’s authorization of the 
surcharge of exempt assets is consistent with other provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code” when the debtor in question “fails to turn over estate 
property.” Id. at 1263. 
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit noted that, pursuant to In re Alderete, 
the court is not “at liberty to ‘grant any more or less than what the clear 
language of [the Bankruptcy Code] mandates.’” Id. at 1264.  Pursuant to 
the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor may claim property as exempt, and if “‘a 
party in interest’ does not object,” that property will be exempt from the 
estate property. Id. The court found that while the Bankruptcy Code 
enumerates “exceptions to the rule that exempted property cannot be 
used to satisfy pre-petition debts or administrative expenses” under §§ 
522(c) and (k), it does not permit the “surcharge or exempt property for 
failure to turn over estate property.” Id. The court recognized that the 
Code contains specific remedies for a debtor’s failure to relinquish estate 
property to the trustee under § 521(a)(4), such as denial of discharge and 
dismissal. Id. The court further noted that § 105(a) does not permit the 
bankruptcy court to “override explicit mandates of other sections of the 
Bankruptcy Code.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the bankruptcy court exceeded 
its equitable authority under § 105(a) in authorizing the surcharge of the 
debtor’s exempt property, as the surcharge of exempt property is 
inconsistent with the Code’s provisions regarding exemptions. Id. 
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ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
In re Graupner, 537 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether a debtor’s negative equity in a trade-in 
vehicle is protected against “cramdown” under the hanging paragraph of 
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9). Id. at 1296. 
ANALYSIS: U.C.C. § 9-103, Official Comment 3 lists expenses that 
are included within “purchase-money obligation” and the “price of 
collateral.” Id. at 1301. Although “negative equity” is not listed, the court 
explained that Comment 3 states that “purchase money security interest 
‘requires a close nexus between the acquisition of collateral and the 
secured obligation.’” Id. at 1302. The court found that there is a close 
nexus between negative equity in a trade-in vehicle and the purchase of a 
new vehicle because the financing was part of the same “package deal.” 
Id. In addition, the court found that the intended purpose of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 was 
to deal with negative equity. Id. at 1303. 
CONCLUSION: The court agreed with the bankruptcy and district 
courts by holding that negative equity is “‘debt for the money required to 
make the purchase’ of a new vehicle” rather than “antecedent debt,” and 
therefore protected against “cramdown.” Id. at 1300–01. 
 
Lenis v. United States AG, 525 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether United States Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) denying a motion for a sua sponte reopening of a case, pursuant 
to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Id. at 1292.   
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “ten courts of appeals have held 
that they have no jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the BIA’s denial of a 
motion to reopen” sua sponte. Id. The court explained that under a “very 
narrow exception” of the Administrative Procedure Act, the court is 
unable to grant judicial review because “agency action is committed to 
agency discretion by law.” Id. at 1293. The court held that review is not 
available when “a court would have no meaningful standard . . . to judge 
the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Id. The regulation at issue, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(a), provided the court with “absolutely no standard to govern 
the BIA’s exercise of discretion.” Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit concluded that the BIA’s decision 
“to reopen proceedings on its own motion . . . is committed to agency 
discretion by law” and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction to review 
the decision. Id. at 1294. 
 
Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 
F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the doctrine of laches can be used as a defense 
in a copyright infringement suit filed within the statute of limitations. Id. 
at 1319. 
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit began by quoting an opinion by Judge 
Learned Hand that predates congressional imposition of the statute of 
limitations on copyright actions, stating that allowing the copyright 
owner to sit on his rights would be tantamount to speculating with the 
infringer’s money and getting a windfall if the infringer’s venture proves 
successful. Id. at 1320. The court noted that the 4th Circuit flatly refused 
to allow the doctrine of laches to curtail the statute of limitations due to 
concerns about separation of powers. Id. However, the 11th Circuit 
followed its own precedent in the former 5th Circuit by observing that 
“the intent of the drafters was that the limitations period would affect the 
remedy only, not the substantive right, and that equitable considerations 
would therefore apply to suspend the running of the statute.” Id. The 
court’s decision was also at odds with the 9th Circuit, which held that 
laches may be used to bar prospective injunctive relief “where the feared 
future infringements are identical to the alleged past infringements and 
are subject to the same prejudice that bars retrospective relief.” Id. at 
1322. The court explained that such a rule would “encourage copyright 
owners to initiate much needless litigation in order to prevent others 
from obtaining effective immunity from suit with respect to future 
infringements.” Id. at 1321. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that the equitable doctrine of 
laches may be used to bar recovery of retrospective damages, but not 
future relief, in copyright infringement suits filed within the statute of 
limitations. Id. at 1321. 
 
In re Donovan, 532 F.3d 1134 (11th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) and 
§ 1291, the denial of a motion to dismiss for an abusive conversion from 
Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 bankruptcy is a final appealable order. Id. 
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ANALYSIS: After finding that “[a] court of appeals has jurisdiction 
over only final judgments and orders from a bankruptcy court,” the 11th 
Circuit stated the general rule that “to be ‘final’ under 28 U.S.C. 158(d) 
and § 1291, an order must end the litigation on the merits, leaving 
nothing to be done but execute the judgment.” Id. at 1134–36. However, 
the court noted that “[f]inality is given a more flexible interpretation in 
the bankruptcy context, because bankruptcy is an aggregation of 
controversies and suits.” Id. Therefore, the court found that what 
generally needs to be finally resolved is “the particular adversary 
proceeding or controversy . . . rather than the entire bankruptcy 
litigation.” Id. The court then diverged from 3rd Circuit precedent and 
instead adopted the rule of the 2nd, 7th, and 9th Circuits which 
“specifically held that an order denying a motion to dismiss a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy case for abusive filing is not a final order.” Id. at 1137. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit ultimately found that “the 
bankruptcy court permitted the Chapter 7 case to continue.” Id. 
Essentially, this did not fulfill the finality requirements for appeals from 
bankruptcy proceedings for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) and 
§ 1291 because the bankruptcy court did not “conclusively resolve the 
bankruptcy case as a whole, nor did [it] resolve any adversary proceeding 
or claim.” Id. 
 
Glazer v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 524 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “Whether medical reports relied on by a plan 
administrator during the review of a denial of benefits must be produced 
to the claimant during pendency of review in order for her to receive a 
‘full and fair review.’” Id. at 1243. 
ANALYSIS: Section 1133 of the Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) requires a plan administrator to provide 
a “full and fair review” of a decision denying benefits to the claimant. Id. 
at 1245. The 11th Circuit explained that producing documents “before a 
final decision is made would not assist a claimant in deciding whether to 
pursue an appeal because the claimant would not yet know if there has 
been an adverse determination.” Id. The court further noted that requiring 
the disclosure of documents during the pendency of a decision would be 
superfluous to requiring the disclosure of documents after the final 
decision is determined. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that medical reports requested 
during the pendency of an ERISA claim review need not be disclosed to 
a claimant until after a final decision has been reached. Id. 
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Hiwassee Coll., Inc. v. S. Ass’n of Coll. and Sch., 531 F.3d 1333 (11th 
Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether defendant, Southern Association of Colleges 
and Schools (“SACS”), is “a governmental actor bound by the Fifth 
Amendment’s due process clause.” Id. at 1335. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that, “the overwhelming majority of 
courts who have considered the issue have found that accrediting 
agencies [such as SACS] are not state actors.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: Given the “absence of any persuasive authority to 
the contrary,” the 11th Circuit joined the majority of courts and found 
that SACS’s termination of Hiwassee College’s accreditation was not 
state action subject to the due process clause under the Fifth Amendment. 
Id. 
 
Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment 
CSX Transp. N. Lines v. CSX Transp., 522 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 
(“RLA”), when does an enforcement action accrue “under the statute of 
limitations after an arbitration award and, alternatively, whether a request 
for interpretation of an arbitration award tolls the limitations period.” Id. 
at 1192. 
ANALYSIS: After plaintiff received an arbitration award, it sought 
to enforce same in the district court. Id. at 1192. The court reasoned that 
the “the plain meaning of ‘within the time limit in such order’ in § 153 
First (p) is that a cause of action to enforce an award arises at the end of 
the time limit set forth in that award.” Id. at 1195. “By requiring a carrier 
to comply by a date certain, the RLA provides plaintiffs with a basis to 
determine whether they have a cause of action for enforcement. Id. No 
compliance by the requisite date indicates that a potential plaintiff had 
time to acquire sufficient factual knowledge for reasonable inquiry to 
reveal the cause of action.” Id. 
The court found that the plaintiff “has not identified any authority 
that supports an accrual rule different from the district judge’s 
application of § 153 First (p). Accordingly, the district judge did not err 
in concluding that [defendant] failed to comply within the time period 
specified in the award.” Id. at 1197. The court further found that, 
“[b]ecause the award in this case expressly provided a time for 
compliance, the relevant authority supports the July 3, 2004, accrual date 
and substantiates the district judge’s dismissal.” Id. “Therefore, the 
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district judge correctly determined that [plaintiff’s] cause of action 
accrued when [defendant] refused to provide back pay by the date stated 
for compliance in the arbitrator’s award. Because [plaintiff] waited more 
than two years after that date to file its petition, the district judge 
properly dismissed [plaintiff’s] enforcement action as barred by the two-
year statute of limitations.” Id. at 1196–97. 
CONCLUSION: The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court, 
which properly dismissed the union’s enforcement action because its 
petition was outside the two-year, statutory limitations period. Id. at 
1192. The Court also held that Plaintiff’s interpretation request did not 
toll the running of the statute of limitations. Id. at 1200. 
 
Makro Capital of America, Inc. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1254 (11th 
Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) permits 
a plaintiff to file an amended complaint involving a qui tam claim and 
have it relate back to the filing of the original complaint which was a non 
qui tam claim alleged on the same factual basis as the amended 
complaint. Id. 
ANALYSIS: The court concluded that the procedural limitations 
under the False Claims Act (“FCA”) would be defeated if relation back 
was permitted in this instance. Id. at 1260. The court based its decision 
on two factors: (1) the government’s ability to refuse to prosecute at all; 
and (2) the requirement that only one suit should be brought on behalf of 
the government. Id. The court refused to allow the amended complaint to 
relate back, reasoning that applying the “relation back” doctrine of Rule 
15 to Plaintiff’s amended complaint, thus permitting the court to exercise 
subject matter jurisdiction despite the FCA’s statutory bar, would not 
have comported with either the purpose behind or the statutory text of 
Rule 15. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that the amended complaint 
could not relate back to the filing date of the original complaint because 
there were intrinsic differences between the original complaint and the 
amended complaint which prevented the defendant from being on notice 
that it may be a party to a qui tam claim. Id. 
 
Sierra Club v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the Clean Air Act grants the EPA 
Administrator discretion “not to object to a permit when the evidence of 
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noncompliance was merely an agency issued violation notice and a 
related civil complaint.” Id. at 1263. 
ANALYSIS: In determining the level of discretion the statute grants 
to the EPA Administrator, the court noted that its decision will not 
“define precisely” petitioner’s required burden of proof under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7661d(b)(2). Id. at 1266. The court further posited that with each 
dispute, the burden will differ depending on the facts, suggesting that the 
burden required will vary with each set of circumstances. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “§ 7661d(b)(2) is 
ambiguous when it comes to defining the type of demonstration required 
to trigger the Administrator’s duty to object,” thus the court was “willing 
to defer to a reasonable interpretation by the agency as to when a 
petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated noncompliance with PSH 
requirements.” Id. at 1267. The court further noted that “where a petition 
successfully demonstrates noncompliance, an objection by the 
Administrator must ensue.” Id. 
 
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Landstar Sys., 541 F.3d 1278 
(11th Cir. 2008) 
Editor’s Note: this case presents two issues of first impression 
concerning 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(h). 
 
QUESTION ONE: Whether a motor carrier lessor may make a profit 
from charge-back items utilized by a truck owner-operator lessee under 
49 C.F.R § 376.12(h), the Truth-in-Leasing Regulations. Id. at 1289. 
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit first defined charge-back items as 
purchases by the truck owner-operator lessees from the lessor motor 
carrier through pre-compensation advances and deductions. Id. at 1282. 
The court noted that since the language of § 376.12(h) did not address 
the present issue, it would “defer to the executive department’s 
construction . . . unless the legislative history of the enactment shows 
with sufficient clarity that the agency construction is contrary to the will 
of Congress.” Id. at 1289. The court then examined the latest regulation 
offered by the Interstate Commerce Commission and concluded that the 
adopted rule did not prohibit motor carriers from profiting from charge-
back items. Id. at 1289–90. The court further stated that this finding was 
supported by the decisions of other courts to have considered the 
question. Id. at 1290. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that 49 C.F.R. §376.12(h), the 
Truth-in-Leasing Regulations, did not prohibit the motor carrier lessor 
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from making a profit from charge-back items utilized by the truck 
owner-operator lessee. Id. at 1290. 
 
QUESTION TWO: Whether 49 C.F.R. §376.12(h) requires the motor 
carrier lessor to provide additional documents to the owner-operator 
lessees than copies of settlement statements that do not list how the 
charge backs are computed where the lessor charges a flat fee for the 
charge-backs. Id. at 1291. 
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit used the interpretative framework of 
the first issue to analyze this second question. Id. at 1291. Finding that 
the regulation was “silent regarding a motor carrier’s ability to profit on 
charge-backs,” the court deferred to the comments offered by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. Id. The court then found that those 
regulations “require[d] the lease to list the items subject to charge-backs 
and to provide access to the documents so that the owner-operators can 
determine how those fees were computed.” Id. The court continued, 
“[n]othing in the[se] comments or the language of the regulation carves-
out an exception for flat-fee charges.” Id. The court also found that its 
holding in this case was symmetrical to the conclusion of other district 
courts. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that 49 C.F.R. §376.12(h) 
required the motor carrier lessor to provide documents to the owner-
operator lessee which listed how the charge-backs were computed, even 
where the lessor charges a flat fee. Id. at 1293. 
 
In re Barrett, 543 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a Chapter 13 [bankruptcy] debtor’s 
surrender of a ‘910 vehicle’ (i.e., a vehicle purchased for personal use 
within 910 days before filing for bankruptcy) fully satisfies a creditor’s 
claim secured by the vehicle and prevents the creditor from filing an 
unsecured claim for any remaining deficiency.” Id. at 1241. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that § 506 of the Bankruptcy Code says 
that a creditor may “seek payment of any deficiency as an unsecured 
creditor” regardless of whether the debtor surrendered or retained the 
vehicle. Id. at 1242. The court’s plain reading of Chapter 3 of the federal 
Bankruptcy Code indicated that Congress intended to make § 506 
inapplicable to a 910 vehicle. Id. at 1246. Therefore, the court found that 
the parties are left to their contractual obligations and applicable state 
laws. Id. 
CONCLUSION: Joining the 4th, 7th, 8th, and 10th Circuits, the 11th 
Circuit held that “a creditor may pursue an unsecured deficiency claim 
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when the debtor surrenders a 910 vehicle,” thus recovering any amount 
due over the value of the vehicle. Id. at 1247. 
 
Wright v. Emerson, 543 F.3d 649 (11th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether a preparer of tax returns, “who is not an 
attorney, CPA, enrolled agent, or enrolled actuary, but who is ‘any other 
person permitted to represent the taxpayer’ as described by 26 U.S.C. § 
7521(b) and (c), is permitted to represent taxpayers before the IRS.” Id. 
at 654. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “a non-practitioner may represent 
a taxpayer before the IRS in certain circumstances, if he provides 
satisfactory identification and proof of his authority to represent the 
taxpayer.” Id. at 655. However, this right is not absolute. Id. “[U]nless 
otherwise prescribed by regulation or notice, this right does not permit 
such an individual to represent the taxpayer, regardless of the 
circumstances requiring representation, before appeals officers, revenue 
officers, Counsel or similar officers or employees of the Internal 
Revenue Service or the Department of Treasury.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “[A]n unenrolled representative, is not authorized to 
represent taxpayers before the IRS if he did prepare their tax returns and 
may not represent taxpayers whose tax returns he prepared when they are 
engaged in dealings with the IRS on matters other than examinations of 
the tax returns which he prepared.” Id. at 657. 
 
Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 536 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a complaint for breach of fiduciary duty 
regarding the diminution of value of a defined contribution retirement 
plan states a claim for benefits under the Employment Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461.” Id. at 1219. 
ANALYSIS: The court rejected the 5th Circuit interpretation that a 
claim for benefits is an allegation of wrongly computed benefits, while a 
claim for damages is a claim that “seeks recover[y] for the trust of an 
unascertainable amount.” Id. at 1222. Instead, the court adopted the 
approach of the 3rd, 6th and 7th Circuits and concluded that a claim that 
seeks an unascertainable amount for relief is not necessarily a claim for 
damages. Id. Relying on Harezewski v. Guidant, the court reasoned that a 
claim for benefits is one that seeks “‘whatever is in the retirement 
account when the employee retires or whatever would have been there 
had the plan honored the employee’s entitlement.’” Id. at 1222–23. 
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CONCLUSION: A complaint for breach of fiduciary duty as a result 
of a decrease in value of a defined contribution plan is for benefits, not 
damages “because it is limited to the benefits actually received and the 
benefits that would have been received if the plan management had 
fulfilled its statutory obligations.” Id. at 1223.  
 
Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutical, Inc., 536 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 
2008) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether, in multi-defendant litigation, the 
limitations period for removal expires upon thirty days from service on 
the first-served or last-served defendant under 29 U.S.C. § 1446(b).” Id. 
at 1203. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “the recent case law favors the 
last-served defendant rule.” Id. at 1205. This rule, the court observed, 
produces an inequitable result in cases where the last-served defendants 
are served more than thirty days after the first defendant is served 
because the period of limitations to seek removal will have expired 
before the last-served defendant is a party to the litigation. Id. at 1206–
07. Further, the court agreed with the 6th Circuit that, “as a matter of 
statutory construction,” the first-served defendant rule “would require 
[the court] to insert ‘first’ before ‘defendant’ in the language of the 
statute.” Id. at 1207. Lastly, the court disagreed with the proposition that 
the last-served rule was inconsistent with the “unanimity rule” because 
the last-served rule allows the earlier-served defendants to join the later-
served defendant’s motion. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit adopted the “last-served” 
defendant rule, which entitles each defendant thirty days to file a notice 
of removal. Id. at 1207–08. 
 
Liquidation Comm’n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Renta, 530 
F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether RICO applies to extraterritorial conduct. Id. at 
1351. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized the split of authority over whether 
RICO applies extraterritorially. Id. The court observed that some courts 
hold that RICO does not apply extraterritorially, “essentially because 
Congress made no explicit statement to that effect.” Id. The court then 
noted the “more widely accepted view,” which states that “RICO may 
apply extraterritorially if conduct material to the completion of the 
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racketeering occurs in the United States, or if significant effects of the 
racketeering are felt here.” Id. at 1351–52. 
Adopting the view that RICO may apply extraterritorially, the court 
then examined whether the conduct at issue satisfied the “effects test.” 
Id. Finding that the “effects test is not satisfied here [because] . . . [t]he 
effects were felt predominantly in the Dominican Republic,” the court 
then stated that “extraterritorial jurisdiction, if it exists, must derive from 
the conduct test.” Id. at 1352. The court emphasized that “use of the 
conduct tests to assert extraterritorial RICO jurisdiction must be 
undertaken with particular care.” Id. As such, the court noted that 
extraterritorial jurisdiction may not be appropriate “if the conduct 
occurring in the United States is preparatory or far removed from the 
consummation of the fraud” or “when conduct occurring in or directed at 
the United States is not central to consummation of the racketeering.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that RICO applies extraterritorially, 
when the conduct central to the consummation of racketeering occurs in 
the United States. Id. 
 
Thomas v. George, Hartz, Lundeen, Fulmer, Johnstone, Kings & 
Stevens, P.A., 525 F.3d 1107 (11th Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the permissible uses in § 2721(b) of the 
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”) “constitute affirmative 
defenses for which the defendants carry the burden of proof.” Id. at 1110. 
ANALYSIS: The DPPA regulates the disclosure of “personal 
information from a motor vehicle record.” Id. at 1109. Despite the 
DPPA’s overwhelming prohibition against the disclosure of personal 
information, the DPPA enumerates fourteen permissible uses for a 
private individual. Id. To answer this question, the court compared the 
enumeration of permissible uses of private individuals to an alternate 
provision in the DPPA, § 2724(a). Id. Section 2724(a) addresses 
governmental responsibility and states no personal information shall be 
disclosed “except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.” Id. at 
1113 (emphasis added). Whereas § 2721(b) contains enumerated 
permissible uses, § 2724(a) emphasized any permissible uses as 
exceptions, intentionally shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. Id.  
Moreover, the court dismissed plaintiff’s concern that the burden of 
proof was more appropriately situated upon the defendant. Id. at 1113–
14. The court reasoned that plaintiff had the disposal of proper discovery 
tools to perfect its argument. Id. at 1114. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held where Congress does not 
directly address the question of burden of proof, “where the statute’s 
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structure and language do not suggest a shift of the burden to the 
defendant . . . and where plaintiffs are not peculiarly at a disadvantage in 
the discovery of necessary facts, we will not shift the burden of proof . . . 
to the defendant.” Id. at 1114. 
 
D.C. CIRCUIT 
Karsner v. Lothian, 382 U.S. App. D.C. 275 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), the 
federal district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant’s 
petition to confirm the stipulated award in an arbitration agreement. Id. at 
281.  
ANALYSIS: Based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), a district court has 
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy 
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 and is between citizens of different 
States. Id. While the parties’ diversity of citizenship was clear, the 
amount in controversy requirement compelled the court to consider this 
question as one of first impression in the D.C Circuit. Id. The court held 
that whether an arbitration proceeding meets the amount in controversy 
requirement should be determined by the amount sought in the 
arbitration (the “demand approach”) rather than the amount awarded (the 
“award approach”). Id. The demand approach avoids the potential pitfall 
of the award approach where the court could compel arbitration but then 
lack jurisdiction to review the arbitration it ordered. Id. at 282. “Further, 
unlike the award approach, the demand approach permits the district 
court to exercise jurisdiction coextensive with the diversity jurisdiction 
that would have been otherwise present if the case had been litigated 
rather than arbitrated.” Id. at 283. 
CONCLUSION: The D.C Circuit adopted the demand approach for 
determining the amount in controversy requirement and held that, 
because the plaintiff sought $104,638.00 plus punitive damages, fees, 
and costs in arbitration, the $75,000-plus threshold for diversity 
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United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
Editor’s Note: This case resolves two issues of first impression. 
 
QUESTION ONE: Whether a civil seizure warrant is an injunction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) thereby providing the circuit court with 
jurisdiction for the interlocutory appeal. Id. at 414. 
ANALYSIS: The Circuit of the District of Columbia reasoned, 
“formal denomination of the court’s order, either in the rules or in the 
order itself, is not dispositive.” Id. at 414. Moreover, the “‘definition of 
an injunction under § 1292(a)(1) is broad: it is any order directed to a 
party, enforceable by contempt, and designated to accord or protect some 
or all of the substantive relief sought by a complaint in more than 
preliminary fashion.’” Id. at 415. 
CONCLUSION: Since the order in question was enforceable and 
non-compliance would be subject to penalty by contempt, the court 
concluded that the order was an injunction as contemplated by 
§ 1292(a)(1) and thus subject to interlocutory appeal. Id. 
 
QUESTION TWO: Whether “seizure of [appellant’s] assets upon 
indictment without an opportunity for adversary hearing constitutes a 
violation of their due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 
415. 
ANALYSIS: The court first found that there were “extraordinary 
circumstances” for the postponement of the due process hearing in 
satisfaction of the three-prong test announced by the Supreme Court in 
Fuentes v. Shevin. The court then undertook the three-part analysis of 
Matthews v. Eldridge to determine whether the Constitution requires a 
“post-deprivation hearing to invasions of constitutionally protected 
interests occurring pretrial where circumstances may compel protective 
seizure before merits adjudication.” Id. Matthews instructs courts to 
consider the following elements: (1) the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
such interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, 
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the 
government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail. Id. 
The court found that the first element weighs heavily in favor of the 
defendant because access to the seized assets not only affects his ability 
to use his property as he sees fit, but, more importantly, affects his ability 
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to exercise his Sixth Amendment right to employ his counsel of choice. 
Id. at 417–418. Next, the court found that the second element militates in 
favor of a post-seizure, pre-trial hearing because the defendant is entitled 
the procedural safeguard to adduce the evidence against him, and must 
be afforded the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time. Id. at 418. 
Finally, the court recognized that there is a legitimate and compelling 
government interest in keeping grand jury proceedings secret. Id. at 419. 
CONCLUSION: The Circuit of the District of Columbia joined the 
2nd Circuit in holding that the “defendants have a right to an adversary 
post-restraint, pretrial hearing for the purpose of establishing whether 
there was probable cause ‘as to the defendant[s’] guilt and the 
forfeitability of the specified assets needed for a meaningful exercise of 
their right to counsel.” Id. 
 
Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 
667 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether “Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(“the Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211–19, violates . . . separation of powers 
because it does not permit adequate Presidential control of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (“the Board”).” Id. at 668. 
ANALYSIS: The D.C. Circuit first found that “by statutory design 
the Board is composed of inferior officers who are entirely subordinate 
to the [Securities and Exchange Commission] and whose powers are 
governed by the Commission.” Id. at 681, n.9. Appellant argued that “the 
Act constitutes an excessive attenuation of Presidential control over the 
Board” because “the double for-cause limitation on removal makes it 
impossible for the President to perform his duties,” and therefore 
violated separation of powers under the Constitution. Id. at 679. The 
D.C. Circuit found that appellant’s argument “conflicts with the Supreme 
Court’s case-specific reasoning in [Morrison v. Olson], which 
emphasizes that there are ‘several means of supervising or controlling 
[Presidential] powers,’” and that “the removal power . . . is one of 
several criteria relevant to assessing limits on the President’s ability to 
exercise Executive power.” Id. The D.C. Circuit recognized that 
“[a]lthough the President does not directly select or supervise the 
Board’s members, the President possesses significant influence over the 
Commission, which in turn possesses comprehensive control over the 
Board.” Id. at 681. Moreover, “the President is not . . . ‘completely 
stripped’ of his ability to remove Board members” because “[l]ike-
minded Commissioners can be appointed . . . and removed by the 
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President for cause, and Board members can be appointed and removed 
for cause by the Commissioners.” Id. at 682. 
CONCLUSION: The court held “that the for-cause limitations on the 
Commission’s power to remove Board members and the President’s 
power to remove Commissioners do not strip the President of sufficient 
power to influence the Board and thus do not contravene separation of 
powers, as that principle embraces independent agencies like the 
Commission and their exercise of broad authority over their 
subordinates.” Id. at 669. 
 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT  
Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 531 
F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the 30-day filing period under the Equal 
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) begins to accrue after the time to appeal 
has expired for all parties when a petitioner enters a final judgment on 
voluntary dismissal. Id. at 1369. 
ANALYSIS: The Federal Circuit first determined that the EAJA 
requires submission of an application within 30 days of final judgment in 
the action and that the final judgment, as defined by the 1985 
amendment, is one that is “not appealable.” Id. The court then 
determined that a “judgment is ‘not appealable’ in EAJA terms after the 
time for filing an appeal has elapsed.” Id. In examining whether a “final 
judgment entered on an unopposed motion for dismissal is amenable to 
appeal,” the Federal Circuit looked toward Supreme Court precedent and 
the Federal Rules, though both are silent on the matter, and toward the 
circuits, which have “answered in the affirmative.” Id. Following the 
other circuits, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the “better procedure is to 
avoid preliminary litigation of time periods for EAJA filings when there 
has been a voluntary dismissal, at least where the order of dismissal does 
not specifically prohibit appeal.” Id. at 1371. Finally, the court reasoned 
that “a clear rule better serves the interests of litigants and the courts, 
rather than encouraging, as here, satellite litigation on ‘functional’ 
premises, adding cost and delay while not yet reaching the merits.” Id. at 
1372. 
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit “adopt[ed] a uniform rule for 
EAJA petitions in the Court of Federal Claims, whereby appeal rights 
from voluntary dismissals are presumed unless expressly disclaimed or 
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specifically prohibited,” and therefore the court found that the expiration 
of the 90-day period for filing a petition for certiorari started the 
defendant’s period for filing its EAJA application. Id. 
 
Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. United States Customs & 
Border Prot., 532 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether plaintiff’s § 7 claim under the Endangered 
Species Act (“ESA”), which alleged that the defendants violated their 
duties under the ESA by allowing the importation of ESA-listed salmon 
without completing the consultation required by the statute, falls within 
the Court of International Trade’s exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 1351.  
ANALYSIS: This issue raised novel concerns over the scope of the 
Court of International Trade’s jurisdiction. Id. In order for the Court of 
International Trade to have jurisdiction over the action, a § 7 claim must 
fall within the court’s exclusive jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581. Id. 
Two possible sources of jurisdiction for the claim include: (1) § 
1581(i)(3), which provides the court with exclusive jurisdiction over civil 
actions that arise out of any law of the United States providing for 
embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of 
merchandise for reasons other than the protection of the public health or 
safety; or (2) § 1581(i)(4), which provides the court with exclusive 
jurisdiction over civil actions arising from administration and 
enforcement with respect to the matters referred to in § 1581(i)(3). Id. at 
1350. The Federal Circuit decided that it would be best to remand the 
case to the Court of International Trade to determine whether the claim 
falls within its exclusive jurisdiction by taking into consideration the 
aforementioned sources of such jurisdiction. Id. at 1351. The court held 
that if the Court of International Trade determines that the claim does not 
fall within its jurisdiction, it should transfer the case back to the district 
court; however, if it does have jurisdiction, it should carry on with 
further proceedings consistent with the circuit court’s opinion. Id. 
 CONCLUSION: If the Court of International Trade determines 
that it has exclusive jurisdiction over the § 7 claim, it should carry on 
with further proceedings consistent with the Federal Circuit’s opinion. 
Id. at 1352. 
 
In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether Congress intended 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) to 
prevent the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) from 
raising a substantial new question of patentability with regard to an issue 
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not yet considered by the PTO, but already considered in district court 
litigation. Id. at 1376. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the statute itself fails to define 
the scope of a substantial new question and that the legislative history 
reveals little consideration of the issue. Id. at 1376–77. The court then 
examined the purposes underlying PTO re-examination and concluded 
that re-examination serves primarily to correct errors in PTO 
examination proceedings. Id. at 1378. The court found PTO proceedings 
to differ in “standards, parties, purposes, and outcomes” from that of 
civil litigation and concluded that an issue litigated in a “district court is 
not equivalent to the PTO having had the opportunity to consider it.” Id. 
at 1376–77. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that due to the distinct nature of the 
two underlying proceedings, a new question of patentability not yet 
addressed by the PTO could proceed as a “substantial new question of 
patentability” pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 303(a). Id. at 1379. 
 
Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 531 
F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
QUESTION: Whether the 30-day filing period under the Equal 
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) begins to accrue after the time to appeal 
has expired for all parties when a petitioner enters a final judgment on 
voluntary dismissal. Id. at 1369. 
ANALYSIS: The Federal Circuit first determined that the EAJA 
requires submission of an application within 30 days of final judgment in 
the action and that the final judgment, as defined by the 1985 
amendment, is one that is “not appealable.” Id. The court then 
determined that a “judgment is ‘not appealable’ in EAJA terms after the 
time for filing an appeal has elapsed.” Id. In examining whether a “final 
judgment entered on an unopposed motion for dismissal is amenable to 
appeal,” the Federal Circuit looked toward Supreme Court precedent and 
the Federal Rules, though both are silent on the matter, and toward the 
circuits, which have “answered in the affirmative.” Id. Following the 
other circuits, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the “better procedure is to 
avoid preliminary litigation of time periods for EAJA filings when there 
has been a voluntary dismissal, at least where the order of dismissal does 
not specifically prohibit appeal.” Id. at 1371. Finally, the court reasoned 
that “a clear rule better serves the interests of litigants and the courts, 
rather than encouraging, as here, satellite litigation on ‘functional’ 
premises, adding cost and delay while not yet reaching the merits.” Id. at 
1372. 
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CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit “adopt[ed] a uniform rule for 
EAJA petitions in the Court of Federal Claims, whereby appeal rights 
from voluntary dismissals are presumed unless expressly disclaimed or 
specifically prohibited,” and therefore the court found that the expiration 
of the 90-day period for filing a petition for certiorari started the 
defendant’s period for filing its EAJA application. Id. 
 
